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FBIS-EEU-96-140 *19 July 1996*

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Albania: Commentary Views U.S. Diplomat's Role in Paper's Rescue

AU1807164196 Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian 18 Jul 96 p 1

[Commentary by T. Ke.: "Soros Makes a Gift of $1 Million Plus Ben Blushi"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The private newspaper KOHA JONE was saved from final closure yesterday after the Soros Foundation granted $1 million to tide it over its financial crisis. The news, confirmed to the press by the Democracy Printing Works yesterday, will no doubt lead to sighs of relief from the newspaper staff and its readers, and will make heroes out of the multibillionaire Soros and the intermediaries who have linked the newspaper staff to him. However, despite the multibillionaire's noble act of generosity, this largest gift in the history of the impoverished Albanian press cannot fail to provoke a few questions, mainly concerning the extraordinary method used to rescue a private newspaper, the people who have acted as intermediaries, and the promises given to Soros that the newspaper receiving his money will toe his line.

How Did KOHA JONE Amass Its Debts?

According to Aleksander Frangaj, KOHA JONE's former editor in chief, the newspaper's debts were caused by the prodigality of Director Nikolle Lesi, the excessively luxurious life-style of his family that had taken over the newspaper, large-scale financial abuses, and above all, Lesi's full control of the finances.

Even after the settlement provided by the Soros Foundation, these causes that have been denounced by the editor in chief have not been eliminated. Lesi and Frangaj will remain the newspaper's owners and will be guided in their work by one of the Soros tribe from Warsaw and Ben Blushi of the Soros office in Tirana. The financial grant is thus being thrown at the same problem in the same place, which means that it will not solve this problem but only alleviate it temporarily. Thus the courage of Soros in filling this financial black hole in Tirana without any clear estimate in advance is to be wondered at.

The Soros Grant and the Albanian Press

When George Soros first arrived in Tirana five years ago, he left Albanian newspapermen speechless when a journalist from DRITA asked for partial financing for the sole national cultural newspaper. Soros said curtly that the newspaper would, thereafter, be considered to be dependent on Soros. Since that time, despite the way the families of two or three senior employees have manipulated the foundation, Soros has steered a middle course in the Albanian press by striking a careful and formal balance in order to justify himself before the public.

Yesterday's grant to KOHA JONE must please everybody because it brings to an end the kind of financial crisis that could seize any of the impoverished Albanian editorial boards tomorrow, but our cheers must die away when we ask whether Soros will wish to repeat yesterday's generosity in the case of a newspaper that does not resemble KOHA JONE in its content. Our concern is the greater when we notice that political and diplomatic mechanisms to rescue KOHA JONE from its financial crisis were found at once, and the life of the newspaper was saved in record time. This means that all the circumstances and motives behind Soros' decision must be made public, in order to belie the rumors in the Albanian press so far that KOHA JONE, having been an opposition newspaper, may pass under the umbrella of Soros together with the parties he defends. If for no other reason, this must be done because Soros' registration in Tirana covers financial support for cultural work alone.

Concern for the Newspaper's Debts and the Interest of a U.S. Diplomat

Despite the size of KOHA JONE's debt, the decision to suspend publication was not made by the Democracy Printing Works, but by editor in chief Aleksander Frangaj. As was clear from his statement, Frangaj made his decision mainly because of the debts. The printing press then acted on the editor in chief's instructions and resumed printing yesterday after the promise of the Soros grant. Despite the clarity of this situation, Charles Walsh, a U.S. diplomat in Tirana, yesterday summoned the director of the Democracy Printing Works and demanded an explanation of why the newspaper had been suspended. Mr. Walsh, who is known to frequent the offices of Blushi and Isaku, suggested to Mr. Bozgo [director of the Democracy Printing Works] that KOHA JONE should be published again, because, he said, despite its anti-U.S. stance, it is in Albania's interests. Mr. Walsh's unprecedented step is perhaps an ordinary diplomatic blunder, of the kind one makes when, out of passion for something you love, you break the rules of residence in a country. Yet his initiative must be praised when he succeeds in intervening not only to make an extraordinary financial grant to a private newspaper, but to deliver alongside the grant one of the directors of the Soros Foundation as the newspaper's editor in chief. It is now expected that KOHA JONE will tone down its anti-U.S. language, especially its fictions about bargaining over the U.S. military bases in Albania. In any case, Mr. Walsh's extraordinary concern is now an open question

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for the administration in Washington, which has perhaps now decided to use the survival of a private newspaper as the basis of the future of U.S. interests in Albania and for a confrontation with the Albanians.

How Will KOHA JONE Be Managed in the Future?

According to all reports, the editor in chief of KOHA JONE from today will be Ben Blushi, press director of the Soros Foundation in Tirana and correspondent of Deutsche Welle. According to Walsh's logic, he is now the person responsible for U.S., German, and "Sorosian" interests in Albania. As sources within the newspaper report, an expert on private newspapers will come from the Soros Foundation in Poland, although nobody has yet reported any change in the newspaper's editorial policy. Lesi and Frangaj will remain at a distance as the newspaper's publishers, and will no longer be center-stage. The newspaper will be managed by the same people, and it is not known how the problem will be solved when its debts again top $200,000. It will be all right if Mr. Walsh is still in Albania to settle the problem with Fejzi [Bozgo], but if Mr. Walsh is protecting U.S. interests in some other country, who will protect the political and financial interests of KOHA JONE?

This is a difficult question to answer, especially now that the newspaper's owners have become eunuchs. Perhaps it would be better to make it clear that Soros has bought the newspaper, and we could then sit back in comfort and read about Soros' policies for Albania.

[Box, p 1]

A U.S. Diplomat in the Role of a...Middleman?!

Charles Walsh, first secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Albania, amazingly and perhaps in a manner that is unusual for the status and behavior of a diplomat, has called Mr. Fejzi Bozgo, director of the Democracy Printing Works, to a special meeting and has asked for explanations from him for the decision to suspend printing KOHA JONE.

In fact, the decision not to print KOHA JONE belonged to Aleksander Frangaj, the newspaper's editor in chief and coowner, and was due to financial abuses and also the newspaper's growing debts to the Democracy Printing Works.

The motives impelling the U.S. diplomat to summon the director of a printing works for questioning and to "advise" him to continue publication for the sake of U.S. interests in Albania are not clear. It would perhaps be madness for an Albanian diplomat in the United States to summon the owner of a private printing works and demand the continuation of a newspaper such as U.S.A. TODAY if its publication were stopped because of financial losses. Imagine how the U.S. proprietor of the printing works would react if an Albanian diplomat were to behave in this way, especially if the reason were "the interests of Albania."

It seems a little difficult to believe that the U.S. diplomat has summoned, questioned, and issued orders to the director of the Democracy Printing Works on the basis of the fact that the printing works was a U.S. gift to the Albanian press.

In this intervention, the U.S. diplomat Walsh joins the former U.S. diplomat Siebentritt, when the latter, almost two weeks ago, summoned the director of an Albanian newspaper to the U.S. Embassy and exerted pressure on him to deny a report about an Albanian association, even making offers to him in exchange for this denial, which was in the interests of the U.S. Government.

Albania: KOHA JONE Owners Issue Statement on Paper's Future

AU1807185296 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 18 Jul 96 p 2

[Statement by KOHA JONE proprietors Nikolle Lesia and Aleksander Frangaj issued in Tirana on 16 July: "Agreement Between KOHA JONE's Coowners Lesi and Frangaj"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nikolle Lesi and Aleksander Frangaj, joint proprietors of the independent newspaper KOHA JONE, supported by their colleagues in the Association of Professional Journalists and by well-known intellectuals in the capital city and motivated by moral and professional responsibility and by respect for KOHA JONE's thousands of regular readers and for their colleagues and the newspaper's staff, met and discussed all the newspaper's problems and the prospects for solving them, with the goal of starting a new phase in the life of KOHA JONE as the most powerful voice of the Albanian press.

At the meeting, the two proprietors recognized their mutual responsibility for the disruptions and upheavals the newspaper has suffered, especially in the last few days, and made a commitment that they would never occur again.

As for the debt to the Democracy Printing Works, which looks large, but is not so striking in the context of the country's largest newspaper, it was decided that this can be ascribed not only to reparable carelessness but to the unwritten economic censorship imposed by the state, which is reflected in the large number of different taxes on the press and the stratospheric costs of printing. This censorship has not permitted the normal organization of independent newspapers, which do not enjoy subsidies

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to even the minimal European level. It has left our press permanently hungry and has made it always difficult for the press to preserve its freedom and independence, to avoid internal conflicts, and to maintain its existence.

On the basis of these views and in order to strengthen the foundation for a future for the newspaper that will match modern standards for the free press, the joint proprietors, Nikolle Lesi and Aleksander Frangaj, have decided:

1. To compile before the end of August a new statute on an up-to-date Western model that will lay down new standards for the newspaper's editorial policy, its hierarchy of responsibility, and its financial administration. Professional assistance from outside will be sought for this.

2. On the basis of their proportion of shares, the two joint proprietors will propose immediately a five-member board of public personalities, three of whom will be appointed by the partner holding 60 percent of the shares and two by the partner holding 40 percent of the shares. This board, after receiving the proposed candidates of the two partners, will decide on the editor in chief by secret ballot.

3. The general administrator of the newspaper and of other activities of the Koha Jone firm will be appointed by a consensus of the two proprietors.

4. The proprietors agree that the editor in chief appointed by the board should appoint responsible editors for the newspaper's sections. The responsible editors will appoint journalists on the basis of each sector's funds. The parties who will sign work contracts will be determined in the new statute.

5. In order to ensure that work starts at once, while waiting for the imminent appointment of the new board and the preparation of the statute, the journalist Ben Blushi will be editor in chief and Agim Xhafka will be general administrator.

This agreement supersedes the only statute of the newspaper, which dates back to 1992, but not the statute of the company, and will be valid until the new statute is compiled.

The coowners, Nikolle Lesi and Aleksander Frangaj, commit themselves jointly to clearing the debt and unblocking the newspaper. They will seek to negotiate the most reasonable conditions from the Democracy Printing Works with the goal of resuming normal publication of the newspaper.

While making apologies and asking for readers' understanding for the nonpublication of KOHA JONE in the last few days, the joint proprietors, Lesi and Frangaj, have confidence in their loyalty and in the organizations of civil Albanian society as valued support not only for the independent newspaper KOHA JONE but for the imperilled institution of the free press in general.

Albania: Local Elections Planned for End of Oct

AU1807205696 Tirana ATA in English
GMT 2015 GMT 18 Jul 96

[By S. Spahiu]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana, July 18 (ATA)—The local elections would be held in the second half of October this year.

All the political forces invited today by the President of the Republic Sali Berisha to join a round table decided local elections should be held on one of the last two Sundays of October this year.

President Berisha told journalists that the political forces reached a consensus that the local elections should be held on one of the last two Sundays of October.

Berisha added that they also decided that the law on local government be considered in a party round table and the necessary steps be proposed to decentralise further the competencies.

"I insisted on an election commission which will include party representatives and be permanent," president Berisha said adding that this will be decided by party round tables.

The SP deputy chairman Servet Pellumbi said to Albanian television that "we consider important the round table on local elections," but added that "the conditions to have free and fair elections are very important." [passage omitted]

Kiniger Passigli thanked Shehu for his readiness to local elections, and added, "it is important that the law on local elections be the same in essence but have some amendments." He also spoke of the abrogation of the antigenocide law and that on the scrutiny of the political figures.

Head of the Republican party Sabri Godo, pointing out the importance of the local government considering it as a basis for the development of democracy, said that the law on elections should be reviewed in order to have fair and democratic elections. He voiced the attitude of his party that the law on genocide should be the same in essence but added that it needs some amendments.

Godo said that if the party meetings should be regular and if everybody expressed the good will to do something, the future elections should be guaranteed.

He said that a consensus was reached on the date of local elections and other issues related to the competencies of the law on local elections.

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Bulgaria: Presidential Elections To Be Held 27 Oct

AU1907093596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 19 Jul 96

[Article by Mariya Tsankova from National Assembly in Sofia on 19 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The presidential elections will be held on Sunday, 27 October. The National Assembly adopted this decision today, with 118 deputies of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group voting for the motion, while deputies of the other parliamentary groups voted against. The opposition's proposal to hold the elections on Saturday, 9 November, was not discussed. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Zhelev Appoints Members to National Bank Board

AU1807132096 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 18 Jul 96 p 1

[Article by Chavdar Tsolov: "Zhelyu Zhelev Appointed New Board of Governors Bulgarian National Bank"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelyu Zhelev has signed Decree No. 245, appointing Zdravko Balyozov, Nikolina Micheva, Andrey Nikolov, and Lena Rusenova as new members of the Board of Governors of the Bulgarian National Bank [BNB], the president's legal adviser Verzhiniya Velcheva announced yesterday.

Zdravko Balyozov (44 years) is head of the BNB's Economic and Monetary Analysis Department, while Nikolina Micheva (39) is head of the State Credits Department and a member of the Board of Directors of the State Savings Bank. Andrey Nikolov (33) is chairman of the Board of Directors of Slavyani Bank and formerly chief of Sredets Bank. Lena Rusenova (44) is a member of the Securities and Fund Exchanges Commission and a lecturer in the Department of Finances at the University of National and World Economy. Nikolov is likely to take the vacant post of chief of the Bank Supervision Department, while Rusenova will take Stoyan Shukerov's seat as head of the Foreign Exchange Operations Department. BNB Governor Lyubomir Filipov will probably inform the Board today of the changes in the departmental responsibilities. Of the previous members of the BNB Board, only Borislav Stratev, head of the BNB's Legal Department, remains in his post, as his term of office expires at the end of the year.

Bulgaria: Lukanov Replaced as Topenergy Chief

AU1807131996 Sofia PARI in Bulgarian 18 Jul 96 p 1

[PARI staff report: "New Chief for Topenergy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Informed sources reported last night that the six-member Supervisory Board of the Topenergy mixed Bulgarian-Russian joint stock company has relieved Andrey Lukanov [National Assembly deputy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party] from the post of chairman of Topenergy's Board of Directors and replaced him with Iliya Pavlov, president of the Multigroup Bulgaria AD holding company.

Bulgaria: Bombing Linked to Prospect of 'Dictatorship'

AU1807132496 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 18 Jul 96 p 9

[Commentary by Plamen Enchev: "Who Is Pushing Bulgaria Toward Dictatorship?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the last few days someone, whether deliberately or not, has been instilling in Bulgarians' minds the thought of a forthcoming dictatorship.

Yesterday's major terrorist act in the center of Sofia and the subsequent anonymous telephone calls warning of explosions in the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly appeared somehow to come quite naturally, following a series of verbal political provocations from a very high place.

Let us recall how the people were scared and threatened with talk of a so-called iron hand, let us leaf through the books or read the speeches of a certain famous philosopher to try to follow his reasoning that the road to democracy must pass through dictatorship. Finally, let us compare every case of raising of tension in the country during the last six years that coincided with events of importance for Bulgaria either at home or abroad.

Someone very much wants to hinder Bulgaria from overcoming the incredible difficulties that are obstructing the country's progress. Someone very much wants to burn the bridges that naturally connect us with the European family. Now, however, the means used for fulfilling this aim have become satanic.

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Yesterday was a day of intimidation, a day carefully chosen and certainly very well prepared for. The perpetrators will certainly be found and not only the antiterrorism experts know this. Now, however, it is much more important to unmask the generator of the destabilization and terror. The bombers must know that sooner or later they will have to pay for their foul mission. It is doubly important that the persons who instructed them should not remain untouched. In the final analysis, we are not living in 1985, and the National Palace of Culture is not Bunovo train station. [scene of previous terrorist bomb incident]

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Czech Republic: Vyborny Discusses Plans for Defense Ministry

AU1907071396 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 15 Jul 96 p 3

[Interview with Czech Defense Minister Miloslav Vyborny by Ferdinand Peroutka; place and date not given: "Prestige of the Army Is Greater Abroad Than at Home"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We spoke with the new defense minister, Miloslav Vyborny (KDU-CSL [Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party]), about his first impressions after assuming the post and his intentions for the near future. We were also interested in sensitive personnel issues and in the minister's ideas on financing the highly demanding armament programs.

[Peroutka] You became minister of defense, but you were apparently prepared also to take over the sector of labor and social affairs. For which one of the two would you opt if you had the choice?

[Vyborny] My appointment as minister of defense should be, I believe, a sufficient answer to your question. When entering the office, I said that this sector was close to me. I insist on it, although this does not mean that there are not other sectors that are close to me.

[Peroutka] You said that you will choose the deputy ministers yourself but, at the same time, you want to respect the coalition agreement on representation of the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] and the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance]. Will the coalition partners offer you several candidates from whom you can choose?

[Vyborny] First of all, I want to completely observe all agreements because observing agreements belongs to general ethics and to the foundations of not only political but also the general human culture of relations. According to the coalition agreement, the deputy ministers' posts will be filled with experts proposed by the coalition parties following a consultation between the minister and the chairman of the relevant coalition party. I will act precisely according to this.

[Peroutka] I certainly understand that so far you cannot be acquainted in detail with the state of the Czech Army, but what are your first impressions?

[Vyborny] At this time, you cannot expect a complete and complex conclusion. Nevertheless, I claim that numerous fundamental steps have been taken in the Army of the Czech Republic that testify to the right direction in its transformation. The quantitative part of this transformation was completed, while the qualitative part will continue. I certainly am sorry that a lot of what the defense sector and the Army have done in the past years was not better presented to the public. It is bad if our Army has a better reputation abroad than at home. I would like to change this.

[Peroutka] Could changes in defense legislation contribute to an improvement in relations between society and the Army?

[Vyborny] I do not know whether legislation can help to improve the relations between society and the Army. That is not the fundamental task of the legislation. It is, however, a well-known fact that it is necessary to prepare a new legal framework for the defense and the Army. No discussions about that—or the relation of our preparations of defense norms to Europe and the world—are needed here.

[Peroutka] It is rumored that the time is ripe to finally solve the personnel issues, which will not be a painless process. Your predecessor preferred the method of persuasion, and you allegedly also reject purges. What will be the main criteria for the work in the command corps?

[Vyborny] A purge is a denigrating term. I certainly am not preparing for purges. This does not change anything, however, on my conviction that a professional soldier must be first of all a soldier. In other words, his qualification includes being apolitical and loyal.

[Peroutka] If a large Army contract—the revitalization of the Air Force, for instance—required exceptional financing, i.e., funds exceeding the ability of the state budget, would you propose a deficit budget?

[Vyborny] I am a representative of the KDU-CSL, i.e., a coalition political party. It is no secret that all the coalition parties consider maintaining and pushing through the balanced state budget one of their fundamental priorities, and that a deficit budget is not acceptable for them. Regarding the defense sector, this means, among other things, that it is necessary to clearly define the priorities first, which would facilitate a high operational readiness of the Army, and the available funds must be used within the framework of these priorities. This does not mean a reduction in the quality of the Army—rather the opposite.

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Hungary: Italian Official on 'Diplomatic Axis' With Hungary

LD1807100996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 17 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Peter Zentai reports on the Hungarian-Italian talks held in Budapest 17 July:

[Zentai] There is no sign of the slightest concern in the EU about the fact that relations between Hungary and Romania and Hungary and Slovakia have become slightly more tense following the joint statement signed on 5 July by representatives of the Hungarian Government, Hungarian parliamentary parties, and ethnic Hungarian organizations beyond the borders. This was said by Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs following his talks in Brussels yesterday on this question, among other things.

This issue was also raised at Kovacs's talks with Italian Foreign Affairs State Secretary Piero Fassino in Budapest. At a news briefing today, Fassino, a former communist promoted to a role of a high-ranking Italian diplomat, strongly supported Hungary in its efforts to join the EU and NATO, so much so that he was even talking about a Hungarian-Italian diplomatic axis.

In reply to my question, Kovacs modified this phrase but admitted that Italy had started to attach special importance to Hungary in the Central Eastern European region and this is why it was embarking on the establishment of a special trilateral cooperation with Hungary and Slovenia.

During the talks agreements on the mutual recognition of driving licences and VAT refunds were also signed.

Hungary: Opposition Leader on 'Consensus' on Minorities

LD1607093596 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 14 Jul 96

[Interview with Viktor Orban, chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, Fidesz-MPP, by unidentified reporter; from the "This Week" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Reporter] We have just seen a film report on the largest scandal of the past week; it was easy to see that the declaration of the Hungarian-Hungarian summit created a sharp debate in the neighboring countries, especially in Slovakia. Do you think that it is an indication that the Hungarian Government is now taking a tougher position, as demanded by the opposition, toward the neighboring countries in the interest of the Hungarian minorities living there?

[Orban] I do not know what the Hungarian Government will do on the international political stage, but one thing is certain: What happened last week was not a scandal but the good news of the week. [passage omitted]

For a long time, for almost two years, there has been a permanent conflict between the government and the opposition parties concerning good-neighborly policy and the way in which the interests of Hungarians abroad can be protected effectively. For the first time in two years, the gap between positions has begun to close again. I can say that as a result of long negotiations there is a chance that a national consensus will be restored on this issue. [passage omitted]

A precondition was that the government should commit itself more openly and resolutely than it has so far to supporting the autonomy efforts of the Hungarians living beyond the borders. The government has done this now—it was included in the [the summit declaration] document—and we are glad, accordingly. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Let us talk about Fidesz now. Three opposition parties will continue their coordination negotiations at the level of party chairmen in September. What are the chances, do you think, that the opposition will unite in September or October to form some kind of electoral alliance?

[Orban] We have never been as close to success as we are now—close to drafting the blueprint of a joint election posture of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Christian Democratic People's Party, and Fidesz.

[Reporter] Does it not bother you in this respect that the popularity of the Smallholders' Party is still high compared to the other three opposition parties, even if it has declined somewhat?

[Orban] The Smallholders' popularity does not bother us because it is an opposition party. The Smallholders' Party is trying to gain the trust of the electorate by using its own program, its own ideas, and its own style. We, shall we say, the moderate center-right parties, are doing the same thing but with a different style, a different program, and different ideas. [passage omitted]

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B-H: Holbrooke, Ganic Comment on Talks, Belgrade Visit

AU1807145396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 18 Jul 96

[Statements by Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke in Sarajevo on 18 July—recorded; both speak in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Holbrooke] First we met with President Izetbegovic and briefed him on the contents of the talks that we had with Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic. Afterward, we held the meeting for which we are actually here in Sarajevo. Mr. Ganic, Mr. Menzies, and my colleague [words indistinct]. Mr. Ganic will travel to Belgrade next week. We also agreed to facilitate completely the exchange mission [misija razmjene]. The exchange mission to Serbia will be headed by Mr. Ganic. Mr. Milosevic will agree a meeting with the congress members and other leading businessmen in Belgrade with Mr. Ganic and the government members. Therefore, this is the main thing on the way toward the economic reconstruction in the region, which, as you know, used to be one unit economically. Let us have Mr. Ganic say something about his trip:

[Ganic] I will help Bosnia as much as I can. I will go where I can do something useful for Bosnia. You know, we did not choose our neighbors, and we must work with them, build bridges, help the ordinary people. Naturally, we know the history, the past, and we know who did what, but we must look ahead. We must make life better for our children, and ensure the stability of the region. Each day, we must do something good for Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why I value our being able to exchange views with Mr. Holbrooke, who is always trying to help. I believe that this is the way to create a better future in this part of the world. [Words indistinct] the U.S. technology, not merely in reconstruction but also in the development of democracy. We must know how to use the U.S. know-how, because the United States is renowned as a giant, a superpower. I am familiar with the United States as a giant, a democratic superpower. Many strive to learn something from their technology. I believe that we will cooperate with the United States. We believe that the Dayton accord must be honored fully, and this is the purpose of my visit.

Naturally, the government must do much planning and work out our platform. We must look ahead.

[Studio correspondent] Finally, Mr. Richard Holbrooke added:

[Holbrooke] You are aware of the problems linked to the Dayton accord, and this is the main reason for my trip. The Dayton accord contains a great number of annexes on economic reconstruction, the construction of roads and railroads, telecommunications, air links, and airports. All these things will covered by the trip that Mr. Ganic is about to make. To make sure that everything runs smoothly, we asked Ambassador Menzies to join the delegation and assist as much and in any way he can.

B-H: Zubak Discusses Federation Progress, Elections

AU1907105596 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jul 96 pp 10-11

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, by Veso Vegar in Mostar; date not given: "The Ombudsman's Decision Is Professional Prostitution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The adoption of the Defense Law is considered to be a major step in establishing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Federal President Kresimir Zubak has spent a long time cooperating in the coordination of disputed articles of the law, which the Federation partners took more than two years to adopt. Zubak commented on the process of coordination, especially the last stage, which was under constant international—especially U.S.—influence.

[Zubak] The process of coordination of the Defense Law took a long time. The collective government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had given the Constituent Assembly the draft law with two disputed articles, believing that the Assembly would work out a solution for those two issues in their discussions. The disputed issues were the right of recruits and reservists to choose the formation in which they would serve and the command of the army in the transition period. The concept of the law was created after the Federation Constitution, which clearly named the Federation president and vice president as the supreme commanders of the army. However, the Assembly failed to reach consensus—moreover, certain additional disputed issues were opened.

[Vegar] At one particular point it seemed that solutions to those disputed issues were found in Dayton.

[Zubak] The agreement on the establishment of the Federation that we reached in Dayton was that the army would be integrated above the corps level, and the Bosnian constitution that was written in Dayton named

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the members of the future Presidency supreme commanders of the armies of both entities. In order to be able to begin with the "Train and Equip" program, U.S. mediators insisted on the adoption of the Defense Law and the negotiations on that. Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic and his deputy Hasan Cengic managed to agree on a great number of articles of the Defense Law, but the problem of the integration of the two existing military components remained unsolved. The Muslims demanded total integration of those two military components, and we did not accept that. Moreover, the Muslims did not want to grant recruits the right to choose the formation in which they would serve.

The session of the Forum on the Federation came later, and vice president Ejup Ganic and myself agreed that the integration would take place in a period of three years. We verified the right of the recruits to choose one of the two military components in which they will serve, but they will not be able to choose the corps or specialty, neither will they be able to refuse to serve in integrated units like the Ministry of Defense, command, etc. Other soldiers are granted the same rights. The issue of civilian command was solved by letting members of the Presidency decide on the mobilization and employment of the army.

Command

[Vegar] Then why do Muslim leaders dispute that arrangement?

[Zubak] They began to dispute it after we returned to Sarajevo, although Ganic consulted other Muslim leaders. Hasan Cengic created problems by changing our arrangements. In our last talks we managed to reach agreement on everything except the civilian command, so the Constituent Assembly adopted the permanent Defense Law. Mr. Izetbegovic and myself should be civilian commanders during the transitional period, and our duty is—after the elections—to create a special law, or change the corresponding regulation of the Defense Law, in order to define the rights and duties of the Croat and Muslim Presidency members, as well as the rights and duties of the president and vice president of the Federation.

[Vegar] What are the differences in your approach to that issue?

[Zubak] The Muslims want to minimalize the role of the president and vice president of the Federation, and we would like the future members of the Bosnian Presidency to have minimum legal capacities. We are yet to see how that issue will be solved.

[Vegar] Does the adopted Defense Law suit the interests of Bosnian Croats?

[Zubak] We have to take the principles into consideration. If we are a part of an entity that has all elements of a state, it is normal that we should have a common army. We have to agree on the level of integration. As this law defines, I think the integration is minimal. If we do not have that minimal integration, we will have two armies, which would not give the project of the Federation much chance. The Federation is our political choice, and it implies a joint army. However, we have preserved the two components of that army, and the Croats have their component as a guarantee that the army will never be used against their people as the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] was. When it comes to command, all decisions are taken on consensus, and nobody can make the Federation engage in a conflict—regardless of whether it is because of internal or external needs—without the approval of the Croat party.

[Vegar] It seems that the elections, despite all resistance, will be held in September. What do you think about the present engagement of international institutions in the preparation for the elections?

[Zubak] I think that everyone in the international community has realized that the terms imposed for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement are unrealistic. However, we must realize that the international community will insist on our obeying those terms. I am afraid there might be too much improvisation. The elections are the crown of the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and I have told many people from the international community that the Dayton agreement will be endangered if there is improvisation and if the elections are not conducted correctly.

Terms

[Vegar] You have also asked for a postponement of the local elections?

[Zubak] I intervened several times and said that situation was not good for the local elections, and the Dayton agreement does not consider those to be obligatory anyway. On the other hand, new municipalities were not formed in the Federation, nor in the Serb Republic, because many municipalities were split by the border between entities—and they were supposed to form new municipalities after the Dayton agreement was signed. Those municipalities must be formed first, and then we can let people form other municipalities where they want them. It would be almost impossible to have correct, regular elections in such a situation. I explained that to Robert Frowick and his deputy, Kenneth Scott, as well as to EU officials, and I am also preparing to

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write a letter to Flavio Cotti, because I am afraid that municipal elections, which are anyway not obligatory, might be irregular.

[Vegar] What did the Mostar elections show, and why did—in your opinion—the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] get only 16 mandatory seats in the municipal council?

[Zubak] The public is not aware that different solutions for Mostar were suggested much earlier. According to those, Mostar should have spent two years under total administration of the EU, and the decision on the political future of the town should have been taken later, by referendum. That was one of the initiatives that Croats opposed. We had reasons to believe that the two year period would be used to "plant" refugees from other areas into the town, which would change the ethnic structure. Then, allegedly lawfully, they would outvote Croats in deciding on which administrative and territorial unit they would belong to, and Croats would have no chance to realize their national interests.

Croats have been stigmatized in Mostar before, without any reason. However, I must admit that there were cases when they were right in slapping us on the fingers. The EU term will expire on 23 July, and the EU wants the new municipal administration installed by then. I told Perez Casado that the ombudsman's decision to annul the Municial Election Commission's decision is pure professional prostitution. Such a decision shows nothing but a resolution to reach practical solutions, regardless of whether there is a discrepancy between them and the electoral regulations, the law, etc. Some people might think it is demagogy when we say that these elections embody the concept that the Croat people have been fighting for, and that is for three municipalities with the Croat majority to be formed in this phase. Of course, that does not mean that we have to accept the unlawful results that they are trying to impose. We have to use all the legal means at our disposal to prove that we are right, and I support the HDZ municipal council's recent actions.

Inconsistency

[Vegar] The impression is that the international community is trying to fulfill their obligations regardless of whether their methods are acceptable, and whether these might have unpleasant consequences?

[Zubak] I agree. I have also told Perez Casado: "If you make decisions that might take us back to the beginning, let alone to a lower stage, what good will you do? You might as well never have organized the elections." The same goes for the entire process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Solutions can be imposed, but they can only be temporary.

[Vegar] The agreement on the establishment of the Federation said that these elections would be valid until the general local elections are held in the entire Federation. However, certain officials have recently said that Mostar will not have local elections in September.

[Zubak] That is another example of inconsistency on the part of the international community. I discussed that with Robert Frowick, and I told him that we must plan local elections in several months, when municipal statutes are adopted in accordance with statutes of cantons. I will repeat that the Dayton agreement does not consider that to be obligatory. As for Mostar, I do not see why it would be a problem to repeat the elections there if elections are held in neighboring municipalities. It also shows how inconsistent the international community is. However, the trap that both parties in the Federation often fall into is asking for mediation by the international community. What we get is people with good intentions and insufficient knowledge of the situation here.

[Vegar] Do you think that the international community is unbiased in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, or that it is more tolerant to any party?

[Zubak] Undoubtedly, it is not unbiased. Croats must realize that. Consider all those kinds of pressure that Croatia has been under, and all those stipulations for its admission into the Council of Europe—and Russia was admitted, although it fails to satisfy the criteria. Apparently, our rightful demands and goals, both in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, do not fit into the superpowers' plans, and that is why we must go through all this. When it comes to the Muslims, they are undoubtedly the greatest victims of this war, and the international community did not react properly at the beginning of the war, when hideous crimes were committed against the Croats and the Muslims. The international community is trying to make up for that now by being more tolerant to the Muslims as the greatest victims. Croats happen to be their Federation partners, so we must pay for their failures.

However, I think that the situation of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina has improved. We have managed to overcome most of the difficulties. Croats came to the referendum before the war and voted for the Federation, and we are close to that goal now. The region under our control is sufficient and good enough for us to live in. We hope that the tension between us and the Muslims will decrease in time, and that our future relations will be based on our interests. We must preserve our national unity for that. Had our unity been a little stronger, for

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instance here in Mostar, the results would have been different.

[Vegar] Contrary to many predictions, the HDZ did not get the greatest number of votes.

[Zubak] Some people are disappointed and depressed because of such results, but I am not. However, the results would have been better if we had had more unity. The additional 1,800 votes that went to the list of Safet Orucevic [mayor of East Mostar]—although we know it was staged—are just further evidence of our political and moral victory, especially in light of the fact that the coalition was formed against us. There is another thing: Five out of six lists were headed by Croats, and there was just one Muslim head of list. Everything was against the HDZ. In addition, certain candidates—especially those from the Joint List—came to the polls with high-ranking officials of the international community, and some of them were invited to the reception on U.S. Independence Day. I believe that their campaign was financed from abroad, and the same thing will probably happen in September. However, the HDZ would have won despite all those things if it were not for our local problems.

On the other hand, what happened in Mostar has opened our eyes. First, now we are sure that we are on the right way. Second, we know that we must organize ourselves, and we must remove all those who cannot think maturely from the decisionmaking body. What other option does the HDZ have?! Let the people decide whether those forces that call themselves Croat and enter coalitions with Muslim parties are really Croat.

The Right Way

[Vegar] You wrote to the prosecutor of the International Tribunal in The Hague to say that the Croats were not satisfied with his work. However, the Tribunal insist on extradition of all suspects. Will the Croat side continue to cooperate with the Tribunal and extradite the Croat suspects although those who committed war crimes against Croats have not been charged?

[Zubak] Cooperation with The Hague is a part of the Dayton agreement, and the implementation of the agreement implies cooperation with the Tribunal. However, Bosnian Croats cannot be as cooperative as Bosnian Muslims, because the subjectivity of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia—which has a legal system, while the Federation does not have one—is questioned. On the other hand, the Tribunal prefers and pays more attention to the former institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, Herzeg-Bosnia cannot and will not extradite anyone, because its legal system is not recognized in the international legal sense.

[Box, p 10]

HVO Members Arrested

[Vegar] What is your attitude toward the recent numerous arrests of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] members by the Muslim police, and trials for alleged war crimes?

[Zubak] We have had several discussions, even in the Council on the Cooperation of the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have agreed not to make the lack of trust deeper, being in the best interests of the establishment of the Federation. However, such events have not ceased to happen. We have no choice, as I have said before, and I have asked the authorities in the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia to take similar actions. In the meantime procedures have started, but we must draw up the warrants for the members of the Muslim nation who are suspected of having committed war crimes. There are more than 600 such persons in Central Bosnia alone. They are at large now. Those are our weak points and we have to take care of them, the sooner the better, especially as all those procedures remain legal, as well as the decisions of judges in Herzeg-Bosnia, until Federation courts are established.

[Box, p 11]

The Police

[Vegar] Certain ministries have nothing but the minister and his deputy—the Ministry of Interior, for instance. When will such ministries be established, and could it be before the elections?

[Zubak] Unlike other ministries, the Interior Ministry only seems to be being established slowly. Of course, I am not referring to the entire ministry. I am referring to the entire process of establishing the police in the counties and in the Federation. International experts are working on that, as well as the international police, and their approach to the issue is gradual and systematic. Ministers and their deputies are just leaving for special courses in certain European countries. Moreover, records of all police officers in all counties will be subject to thorough inspection. That will give us the exact number of police officers whose records are satisfactory, and they will be allowed to stay in the police force. That task will be done at the level of cantons, which means that they have to adopt their laws on internal affairs.

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B-H: Muratovic Comments on Talks With World Bank

AU1807180496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Muratovic voiced particular satisfaction with the outcome of the talks with the World Bank, in which certain disagreements between Sarajevo and the World Bank have been resolved. In the talks held with the World Bank representatives on two occasions [words indistinct] they raised the question of the postponement of the earlier-agreed Word Bank long-term credit under very favorable conditions, by which the pressing budget problems, such as the payment of pensions and protection for the most endangered categories of population, would be resolved, while some of these funds would also be used to reanimate production.

It was demanded during the talks with the representatives of the U.S. Administration that the U.S. assistance be accelerated and that a portion of the aid for the coming year be brought forward to this year.

About the talks in the World Bank and the possibility that the hitherto postponed credits be approved soon, Prime Minister Muratovic said the following to our New York correspondent:

[Begin recording] Recently, we have had a problem with the World Bank regarding the postponement of the decision on the transitional period credit. This involves a $100 million credit for the Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation budgets. The problems arose due to the noncompliance with one of our conditions, namely, that a unified payment operations system be created in the federation. We became deadlocked over the condition that, within the federation, only German marks be used as the means of payment into the federation budget. This would cause enormous problems. An internal World Bank document, which suggested the postponement of the credit allocation, treated this issue in a superficial manner. We held talks here in the World Bank, also with (?Mr. Lipton) from the State Department and came to a conclusion that the solution proposed would be considerably more damaging than beneficial for Bosnia-Herzegovina. We concluded that a solution would be sought that would allow us to get credits, either by unifying the payment operations system in a manner that will not cause great damage to the state or in any other manner areed by ourselves and the World Bank. [end recording]

B-H: Sarajevo Media Say Bosnian-FRY Ties at 'Turning Point'

LD1807162996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1607 GMT 18 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 18 (TANJUG)—Relations between Sarajevo and Belgrade are at a turning point—political sources in Sarajevo assessed Thursday in connection with the news that Vice-President of the Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina Ejup Ganic, together with an economic delegation, will travel to the capital of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Belgrade next week.

The U.S.-sponsored Muslim-Croat Federation was formed in Washington in March, 1994, to end one-year fierce fighting between Muslims and Croats for control over territories with mixed populations.

The Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic] are two entities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

All Sarajevo media said that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had invited Ganic to head a big economic delegation which would review the re-introduction of civil flights and telephone links between Belgrade and Sarajevo, which were discontinued after the outbreak of the war in 1992.

Richard Holbrooke, special envoy of the U.S. President Bill Clinton, told reporters in Belgrade on Wednesday, after meeting Milosevic, that it was agreed that Ganic should visit Belgrade next week, to enable the start of serious trade negotiations between the FRY and the federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sarajevo political circles attach great importance to the visit, assessing that future economic cooperation will enable serious political dialogues between Belgrade and Sarajevo.

Prime Minister of the Sarajevo Government Hasan Muratovic recently said efforts were being made towards normalizing relations with Yugoslavia. He specified that his government was committed that relations be first established on the economic plane to the mutual interest.

B-H: IFOR To Increase Presence in Sarajevo Suburbs

AU1807183796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Responding to a request by the UN International Task Police Force, the Implementation Force [IFOR] has agreed to increase the number of

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its patrols in Sarajevo suburbs as soon as possible, IFOR spokesman in Sarajevo Major Brett Boudreau announced at a news conference today.

This action is a response to the growing harassment of the Serbs in the Sarajevo suburbs and is envisaged as a support for the international policemen and not their replacement, Boudreau said. He nevertheless emphasized that the military presence cannot be a long-term solution and that IFOR will insist on dialogue as a way of overcoming interethnic difficulties.

B-H: Radio Reports on 'Agreement' With Holbrooke

AU1907115796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the assembly of the Serb Republic, and Foreign Minister Dr. Aleksa Buha took part in yesterday's talks between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and special envoy Richard Holbrooke.

Yesterday Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic again talked to the U.S. President's special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, and his aides about the implementation of the peace agreement in the Bosnia-Herzegovina union. Particular emphasis was on the coming elections.

TANJUG reports that an agreement was reached by the representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Serb Republic, and the United States concerning issues crucial for a faster normalization of the situation and relations within the Bosnia-Herzegovina union.

It is necessary to carry out adequate preparations for the election of legal institutions, the establishment of which will contribute to the consolidation of peace and stability.

B-H: 'Text' of Communique on Karadzic's Resignation

LD1907135596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1055 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Jul (TANJUG)—We are carrying the text of a communique issued by Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Aleksa Buha, and Biljana Plavsic.

Here is the text of the communique:

"The signatories reaffirm their obligation to implement the general framework of the peace agreement and its annexes agreed on in Dayton and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, and they make the following statement:

"1. As of 19 July 1996, Dr. Biljana Plavsic has assumed the office of temporary acting president of the Serb Republic until completion of the elections on 14 September 1996, scheduled in accordance with the Dayton peace agreement, when a new president will be elected. So that, therefore, on 19 July 1996, Dr. Radovan Karadzic has relinquished the office of the president of the Serb Republic and has relinquished all powers associated therewith.

"2. Dr. Radovan Karadzic states that he will withdraw immediately and permanently from all political activities. He will not appear in public, or on radio or television or other media or means of communications, or participate in any way in the elections.

"3. As of 19 July 1996, Dr. Radovan Karadzic relinquishes the office of chairman of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and all the functions, powers, responsibilities of the chairman of the SDS will be frozen until the SDS chooses a new chairman. These powers and responsibilities will be taken over by Professor Buha."

The communique is signed by Radovan Karadzic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Biljana Plavsic, and Aleksa Buha. [Serbian] President Slobodan Milosevic and [Yugoslav Foreign] Minister Milan Milutinovic witnessed the signing of the communique.

B-H: Ganic Sees Karadzic Resignation as 'Significant Step'

AU1907124696 Paris AFP in English 1224 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, July 19 (AFP)—Stepping down from power of the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic is a significant step forward towards creating conditions for September 14 elections, Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnian Moslem-Croat federation said here Friday. "What Mr. Holbrooke achieved in Belgrade is a significant step forward for creating conditions for the elections," Ganic told reporters here.

US envoy Richard Holbrooke announced Friday morning that Karadzic, indicted for war crimes by a UN court in The Hague, had signed he was stepping down from political and public life.

"The situation is simplified now for removal of those indicted for war crimes. Now war criminals cannot hide behind any political function," he said. "I do not doubt that Karadzic will continue to act until he is removed, that he will continue to create a parallel system, that he will work to obstruct the Dayton peace process and peace in the region," Ganic warned. Under last year's Dayton peace accord Karadzic cannot run for or hold any public office.

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"His place is known, he should answer to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague," Ganic said. "Now it's basically an obligation of the international community to remove indicted war criminals and finish the job," he added.

B-H: Karadzic Refuses Monastery Asylum Offer

LD1907103996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0944 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Athens, 19 Jul (SRNA)—Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and General Ratko Mladic, commander of the main headquarters of the Serb Republic Army, have refused the asylum offered to them in the Serbian monastery of Khiliandari on the Holy Mountain [Athos, in Greece].

According to yesterday's edition of the large-circulation Athens newspaper TA NEA, which cites an unidentified representative of Khiliandari, President Karadzic said:

"We will not leave our homeland. We will remain here, in the country which we have defended and where we have our roots."

B-H: Bosnian Serb Radio, TV Not Reporting Karadzic Resignation

AU1907103896 Paris AFP in English 0954 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 19 (AFP)—Ordinary residents of the Bosnian Serb "capital" Pale had by mid-morning Friday not been told about the resignation of Radovan Karadzic as leader of the Bosnian Serbs. Neither Bosnian Serb television nor Pale radio carried any information on his statement that he was stepping down as Bosnian Serb president and leader of the ruling SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] party in their 10:00 a.m. (0800 GMT) bulletins. Journalists at the stations said they had been told the news but refused to comment on why they were not broadcasting it. The news came from US envoy Richard Holbrooke in Belgrade earlier Friday.

Told the news by an AFP correspondent, a young woman who asked not to be named, said "That's awful. What future have we got without him." A fifty-year-old man, Milan, said however the extreme nationalist SDS has enough "patriotic" members in its ranks to "continue the politics of Karadzic."

Bosnian Serb officials said meanwhile, that the US diplomat charged with organising the Bosnian elections, Robert Frowick, had met Biljana Plavsic, the new temporary acting Bosnian Serb president in Pale early Friday morning.

B-H: OSCE's Frowick, Milosevic React to Removal of Karadzic

AU1907100196 Paris AFP in English 0936 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, July 19 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect Radovan Karadzic has resigned as president of the Republika Srpska and stepped down as leader of the ruling Bosnian Serb party, U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke said Friday [19 July]. [passage omitted]

As well as relinquishing his post "immediately and permanently" as president of the Serb part of Bosnia, he stepped down as head of the ruling Serb nationalist party.

His resignation had been demanded by the Bosnian Government and the head of the organisation overseeing Bosnia's elections, Robert Frowick, and was expected to clear the way for the U.S. diplomat to announce later Friday the official start of the campaign for Bosnia's first post-war general elections.

Holbrooke added that: "This statement falls short of our goal which is that Karadzic and (Bosnian Serb army chief) General (Ratko) Mladic be in The Hague to stand trial before the international war crimes tribunal."

Both the two main Bosnian Serb leaders have been charged on genocide and war crimes charges by the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague.

"We were not able to achieve that on this trip but we have received a signed statement from Karadzic removing himself from political and public life," Holbrooke said.

Speaking to AFP as he entered his offices in Sarajevo, Frowick, in a first reaction said: "This is an extremely important step forward."

He was expected to make an announcement on the elections in a press conference in Sarajevo at 0945 GMT.

Milosevic said that Frowick's decision to bar the SDS from the elections unless they replaced Karadzic had been "very important."

"NATO's support for our readiness to reimpose sanctions on Serbia and (Bosnian Serb entity Republika) Srpska was very important," he added.

"It's the end of Karadzic's political career," Holbrooke said.

Asked what guarantees he had that Karadzic would respect his undertakings, Holbrooke said: "We have no

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guarantees. We have the signed statement, witnessed by President Milosevic.

"In our previous experience when President Milosevic witnesses and undertakes, it happens. When he doesn't, it doesn't," he added. [passage omitted]

Officials in Sarajevo were expected to react to the news later Friday.

B-H: NATO Secretary General Praises Karadzic Resignation

AU1907111796 Paris AFP in English 1648 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Brussels, July 19 (AFP)—Radovan Karadzic's resignation as president of Bosnia's Republika Srpska has removed an important obstacle to the holding of fair and free elections in September, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said Friday.

But the NATO leader added in a statement: "Justice remains to be done. The proper place for Radovan Karadzic is in the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague to stand trial for the war crimes for which he has been indicted."

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization would remain cautious and vigilant that Karadzic kept to his word and did not resume political activity, Solana said.

He paid tribute to US envoy Richard Holbrooke's efforts in securing the step-down, which he said had been the result of continuous diplomatic pressure from the international community. [passage omitted]

B-H: Hague Tribunal Deems Karadzic's Withdrawal 'Belated'

AU1907092796 Paris AFP in English 0859 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, July 19 (AFP)—The UN tribunal which indicted Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic for warcrimes described his withdrawal from political office Friday [19 July] as belated, and insisted that it still wants to arrest him.

Reacting to a statement in Belgrade by U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke that "it's the end of Karadzic's political career," tribunal spokesman Christian Chartier said: "It is only one step, and a belated one at that, on the road which ends at The Hague."

Chartier said that Karadzic's resignation "is in line with the Dayton peace accords and is the result of a process set in motion by the tribunal's publishing of charges against Karadzic."

B-H: NATO Welcomes Reports on Karadzic's Resignation

AU1907082896 Paris AFP in English 0816 GMT 19 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, July 19 (AFP)—NATO on Friday [19 July] welcomed news that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had signed a statement "removing himself" from public and political life with immediate effect.

U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke announced Karadzic's statement from Belgrade. He said the statement was witnessed by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

"It is good news that Richard Holbrooke has obtained in Belgrade," said a NATO official here.

"This act is only a step on the road which must ultimately lead to Radovan Karadzic's appearance before the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague," the official said. Karadzic has been indicted by the UN tribunal on war crimes charges.

"In the immediate future, this move should allow the elections in Bosnia to go ahead in a much more favourable climate," he said.

The official said NATO, which is leading the peace implementation force in Bosnia, must "stay vigilant to be totally sure that Karadzic will be an invisible man and not play a behind-the-scenes role."

The official, who asked not to be named, said the statement was the result of skillful diplomacy and the combined efforts of top civilian representative in Bosnia Carl Bildt and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana.

B-H: UN Calls For Condemnation of 'Outrageous' Threat to Police

AU1807131696 Paris AFP in English 1139 GMT 18 Jul 96

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, July 18 (AFP)—A senior Bosnian Serb official has vowed that UN police will be captured and killed if indicted war crimes suspect Radovan Karadzic is arrested, a UN official said Thursday.

The official, the mayor of Ugljevik, a Serb-held town in northern Bosnia, also threatened "military action" against NATO peacekeepers and the UN police (IPTF), UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko said.

The threat is the strongest yet in a string of warnings issued by a series of Serb officials over the last week and reflects growing tensions over the fate of Karadzic.

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Previously, the Serbs had only threatened to take members of the 1,600-strong UN police force hostage.

Ivanko described the remarks made to a UN civilian official by Miladin Stefanovic, Uglijevik's mayor, as "outrageous" but said they were a "very explicit threat."

Initial security measures had been taken and "contingency planning" was currently underway Ivanko added. The situation had also been discussed during meetings between the IPTF chief and senior NATO commanders in Bosnia.

A spokesman for the NATO-led peacekeeping force (IFOR) said NATO soldiers "stand by the IPTF on this 100 per cent, we will not be intimidated."

"We have a robust force with trained professionals, a viable mandate and...we are not afraid to put that into practice and use that force if required," Major Brett Boudreau said. [passage omitted]

Ivanko said that roughly half the IPTF monitors in Bosnia are in Republika Srpska, the Serb entity created under the Dayton peace accords, stationed at some 25 bases.

The police, drawn from 34 countries including the US, several European states and some Muslim countries, are unarmed. The officers are tasked to help train local police forces in the transition from war to peace and normally live in the local community in ordinary residential houses without special guards.

Ivanko said assurances had been received from the interior minister of Republika Srpska that no harm would come to the IPTF. However, he said the time had now come for the threats to be "publicly condemned and to try to do something about this."

A spokesman for Carl Bidlt, the top international civilian in Bosnia echoed the call. "We would expect that people that make threats like this be silenced, at least by removal from office," Bildt's spokesman, Column Murphy, said.

B-H: Commentary: West Ignoring Milosevic's Part in Crimes

LD1307093996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 12 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Are the trial in The Hague and the arrest warrant for Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic just another example of the boundless cynicism of the world? The process of the public hearing of evidence raises the question of the political consequences of the trial. This is the subject of a commentary from Adamir Jerkovic:

[Jerkovic] It is perfectly clear to everyone—the publishers of the arrest warrants and the survivors of the atrocities—that the latest order for their arrest will not bring Karadzic and Mladic to The Hague, nor will this sudden awakening of a love of justice in the world raise the brutally murdered thousands from their known and unknown burial places and mass graves. Who, therefore, will benefit from this great performance with its minimal effect?

A few days ago the French newspaper LA CROIX disclosed the story of an anonymous high-ranking official in the U.S. Administration who said that the CIA, with the help of satellites and spy planes, monitored—from a distance but live—the massacres in Srebrenica, which were immediately reported to U.S. and Western politicians. Their resolute response to this terrible crime was—silence.

At that moment all the horrors of Srebrenica did not fit into their emotionally unburdened, pragmatically cold scenario for the solution of the Bosnian crisis. Today, however, these same perpetrators of mass crimes against the Bosniaks have for these same important international factors quite a different usage value, for several reasons.

First of all, with The Hague trial they are trying to wash away the great bloody stain on their consciences, and it is the height of cynicism that they see their success in this as a fait accompli. But a far more important aim is to manipulate now the evidence of their own responsibility for the tragedy in Srebrenica, a truth of a kind, to their own advantage, in keeping with their political interests. This entails, at least in the short term, calming the turbulence in Bosnia for the sake of the evident domestic needs of the West.

Following the pragmatic code of its foreign policy, the West, having set the tone of the direction of the Hague trials, will forgive Milosevic for the sins he has committed in Bosnia. In this way it will partly absolve itself for what it saw but did not want to see. In this way the West has determined Karadzic's fate and allocated the role of Milosevic. The compromised Karadzic, identified as a war criminal, is the definite loser and he is disappearing from the political stage, which, for the West, will be another example of the final victory of justice, while Milosevic, in keeping with the pragmatic views of the great powers, retains the role of regional arbitrator.

What Milosevic was doing secretly until recently in the so-called Serb part of Bosnia, convincing the West that it was hallucinating when it made accusations against him, he will now do openly, with the full knowledge of those who, if there were more justice in the world, ought to escort him bound to The Hague.

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B-H: SNS Warns of Terrorism if Karadzic, Mladic Arrested

LD1807145296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 18 Jul (SRNA)—Holbrooke's insistence on the removal and arrest of Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and General Ratko Mladic is tantamount "to steering things directly toward international terrorism," a statement issued today by the Assembly People's Party (SNS) says.

"The aim of U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke's visit to the former Yugoslavia is to strengthen the Muslim-Croat Federation and promote U.S. global and economic interests in the region," the statement says, and adds:

"The return of Holbrooke, who is known for supporting [Croatian President] Tudjman's expulsion of the Serbs from Krajina and Izetbegovic's conquest of Serb land, represents fresh international pressure on the Serb Republic and its legitimate leaders."

"This U.S. diplomat's statements on the alleged violation of the peace agreement by the Serb Republic are at odds with the statements by Carl Bildt, the high representative for civilian issues, on the human rights' situation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by Aleksander Ivanko, a spokesman of the International Police Task Force, on the demise of the remaining Serbs in Sarajevo," the SNS says.

This party "is very worried by any meeting between international negotiators and the Belgrade authorities, because every such meeting brings with it a fresh concession—to the detriment of the Serb Republic and the Serb people as a whole."

B-H: People's Party Expects '70 Percent' of Serb Entity Vote

AU1807092996 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] "The People's Party of the Serb Republic will not be putting up candidates for the posts of president or vice president of the Serb Republic in the coming elections, but will support a presidential list of one of other parties," party president Radoslav Brdjanin said at a news conference today. In his regular address to the media, Brdjanin said he would be heading the People's Party list for Serb Republic deputies. Cvijetin Lukic of Bijeljina heads the list for the Council of Representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Union, while Milorad Zivanovic heads the list for list of deputies for the Banja Luka municipality.

"The People's Party of the Serb Republic will be represented in the elections in 15 Serb Republic municipalities and we are counting on getting about 70 percent of votes of the Serb Republic citizens," said Brdjanin and emphasized that the People's Party advocates a multiparty parliament, strengthening the statehood of the Serb Republic, as well as crime deterrence on all levels. Commenting on the arrests warrants issued by the Hague Tribunal, Brdjanin said that there was absolutely no reason to prosecute Radovan Karadzic, because he did not make a single decision without the approval of the Serb Republic people's assembly.

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Croatia: Van den Broek Says Regional Cooperation Necessary

AU1907111096 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jul 96 p 2

["Exclusive" interview with EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek by Bruno Lopandic in Zagreb; date not given: "We Do Not Want the Restoration of Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While on his two-day visit to the region (Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade), EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek had several ministerial-level talks in order to tackle once again the hot topic of the EU's regional approach to the countries of former Yugoslavia. In an exclusive interview for SLOBODNA DALMACIJA, given ten minutes before his plane took off for Belgrade, the EU commissioner explained how the talks in Zagreb had gone.

[Lopandic] Mr. Van den Broek, how pleased are you with the results of your talk with Minister Granic [Croatian foreign minister]?

[Van den Broek] We talked about a number of questions that concern this region, and about the problems which are still before us. With Minister Granic we discussed important topics, but the most important is of course the further course of the peace process. Once again we asked the Croatian side to confirm its support for that process and what is at the moment most important—the holding of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Lopandic] Why did you need further confirmation of the Croatian support for the peace process?

[Van den Broek] We are entering a very important period. We talked a long time with Minister Granic about the situation in Mostar after the elections were held. We asked Croatia to support the results of the elections on its part.

[Lopandic] In the joint statement given together with the head of Croatian diplomacy you did not mention a topic that caused a stormy reactions—the regional approach of the EU. Did you talk about that, because the latest talks about it were not very "smooth?"

[Van den Broek] Once again the Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring and I tried to convince the Croatian side that within the regional approach there is no mention of the restoration of the old or the creation of a new Yugoslavia. Croatia is only concerned and worried about the institutional connections with the other countries of former Yugoslavia. We told them once more that our approach had nothing to do with that. The EU is interested in peace and stability in the region, and that stability cannot be realized without the mutual cooperation between the neighboring countries.

[Lopandic] How do you believe that that cooperation should start? Is it the basic precondition for the establishment of relations between Croatia and the European Union?

[Van den Broek] You cannot ask us to start the cooperation unless you can offer the same cooperation to your neighbors. Europe is conceived on the basis of cooperation between states in all aspects of life and we want to apply that principle in this region too.

[Lopandic] The conditions of cooperation, about which Croatia is concerned, are important. Have you determined the criteria for that cooperation?

[Van den Broek] The point is in the basic position. Croatia must show good will for cooperation. If the other side starts showing hesitation or refuses that cooperation, then it refuses to cooperate with the European Union. Simply, make that difference in order to create a quite different position.

[Lopandic] Before you came to Zagreb it was announced that the talks between the EU and the Republic of Croatia would continue. Has anything been concretely agreed on in Zagreb?

[Van den Broek] It is true that that we also talked about that. The meeting in Zagreb is seen as a preparation for a serious start of talks about the continuation of negotiations between Zagreb and Brussels, which will start in the fall.

[Lopandic] How do you evaluate the situation in eastern Slavonia?

[Van den Broek] I am glad that the process goes on, and it is important to keep the pace of positive changes.

[Lopandic] Why then has the European Commission still not sent the financial help in the amount of 10 million dollars intended for that area? That money should have been sent a long time ago.

[Van den Broek] I believe that that will be done in September.

[Lopandic] As was officially said after the meeting, you also talked about the question of the mayor of Zagreb, which is one of the European conditions for the continuation of talks....

[Van den Broek] I must first say that we talked about everything in an open and candid way, even about the most sensitive issues. The issue of the mayor of Zagreb, I have a feeling, will be solved in the next few weeks, and that on the basis of compromise.

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Croatia: 'No Serious Problems' in Joint Police Force

AU1807174396 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 17 Jul 96

[Unattributed report from the "Vise od Vesti" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] Petar Djukic, the head of the joint UN police forces in the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, stated yesterday that the number of mixed Serb-Croat police patrols in the province has been increasing.

He would not specify how many groups of two Serb and two Croat policemen are patrolling the province at present, but did say that the number of groups corresponds to the security situation and the number of criminal acts.

Djukic said that there have been no serious problems in the activity of the joint police forces, which took on all the police tasks in the province on 1 July, and no incidents between the Serb and Croat policemen have been registered.

Djukic's deputy, Josip Mikelic, is a Croat; he comes to work every day from Osijek. The joint police forces are directly subordinate to Jacques Klein, the UN administrator, and consist of the total of 1,450 people, 1,300 of whom are Serbs and 150 Croats, a ratio that will not change until the end of the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] mandate.

Croatia: Betrayal of Serb Interests in Srem-Baranja Seen

AU1807190796 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 16 Jul 96 p 2

[Commentary by Nikola Grubjesic: "Silence of the Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] How and why the Republic of Serb Kraina fell is definitely a question that requires a truthful answer, as does the question of why General Loncar (who is currently living in Serbia), did not give the order to advance toward the virtually unoccupied cities of Osijek and Vinkovci during last year's aggression against the Kraina. Trade, treason, or something else, will hover over this land for a long time to come, land that until yesterday had been alive with Serbdom, and now expires at the altar of its own illusions in the bruised path that had tied it to Belgrade, whence emanated the commands connected to the Serb golgotha and banishment.

Many former political leaders had fallen on this very question, if nothing else, because of the fact that they are now the idle observers of the furious passing of yet another Serb land into the grave of the Serb people. And what can one say but this: The Erdut agreement practically ended the war, with the capitulation of the Republic of Serb Kraina Army, thus lifting the moratorium on the wartime activity of political parties. However, in spite of that, the political parties still continue to be silent, even though this Serb region, regardless of the will of the people, is now deeply submerged in the political, economic and neo-fascist structure of Croatia.

Is this how the end came for many of the formerly patriotic political party leaders such as Rade Leskovac (SRS)[Serbian Radical Party]; Milorad Visic (SNO)[Serbian National Renewal]; the leaders of the SDS [Serb Democratic Party] for the Kraina; the SDS of the Serb lands; SRS "Nikola Pasic" [Serbian Radical Party "Nikola Pasic"]; or the SPS [Serbian Socialist Party], which had been operating from a hidden corner throughout the entire war, shattering the last walls of defense or hope that somehow these lands would be preserved. Many rookie socialists and members of JUL [Yugoslav Left], who had been active in the political or economic life of the Kraina, and who were until recently "fierce" defenders of the Serb cause, have long since found shelter in Serbia, after having completed their dirty work on behalf of Belgrade or so-called peace, which is a word they use to denote unconditional (and unnecessary) capitulation. Among them are politicians and military strategists such as Milan Milanovic and Dusan Loncar (the last commanding officer, who disarmed his own army). Others, such as Goran Hadzic, Slavko Dokmanovic (the remaining two men who signed the capitulation), Dusan Teofilovic, and Miroslav Keravica, will follow in their footsteps and come to Serbia to apartments that will be waiting for them. To be honest, these men are all wanted by the Ustashi courts in Zagreb, or even the Hague Tribunal, and that is why their passiveness and consistent obedience to Belgrade and its interests (where nationalism, as the basic interest, is ignored) is all the more peculiar.

Others also sought "safety" in Serbia, others such as Stanko Vujasinovic (Chetnik voivoda [military leader]), Miroljub Vujovic, and many other true patriots, who had to leave this area after the capitulation and sudden turn of events in which people began openly pointing their fingers at them as the sole culprits for the Vukovar drama, with the unavoidable words, "if it had not been for the JNA [Yugoslav Peoples Army], we would have lived in harmony with the Croats."

Be as it may, we have to point out that each side had its Brankovic's [alluding to Vuk Brankovic, Serbian

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medieval lord, whom folk literature identifies as a traitor who caused the Serbs to lose the battle of Kosovo in 1389] who had seen it in their own interest and benefit to speak up for the Serb cause just to grab their share of power. Perhaps that is why the political parties are passive, perhaps that is why they are silent in this decisive moment, they are looking for a way out by joining up with so-called nongovernmental or citizens' organizations. These are again leaders whose aim is to find a way to remain in Croatia, but with new roles, even at the cost of betraying their own national interests.

In response to reporters' questions as to why the political parties are still passive, the answer given is that the moratorium is still in force and that it is not wise to aggravate the uncompromising Jacques-Paul Klein. Others think that everything is lost anyway, and that this has always been Croatian territory, shooting poison arrows at Belgrade and its hoax epitomized in the famous slogan "all Serbs in one state," which is nothing but a defense of Serbian interests in Kosovo and Metohija, in which the Serbs from the Republic of Serb Kraina and the Serb Republic, were sacrificed.

It is true that the interparty council still exists and functions (which was confirmed during the most recent elections for town mayor, prime minister, and president), but obviously only as a pointer for different official functions, and not as an affirmation and defense of national interests. In spite of the fact that they knew about the signing of the shameful capitulation, not a single party from this territory voiced its protest, either against those who signed, or against those who made them sign, not to mention organizing a protest rally or at least a roundtable to try to answer why the people had been tricked and why they were being shoved into the arms of their executioners. As opposed to political parties, nongovernmental organizations have announced rallies to protest to administrator Klein, against a one-sided approach to resolving the Danube region, and to express general discontentment over the coercive pushing of this region into Croatia, which is a violation of basic human rights. The first to organize such a meeting will be the women, while the parties still remain silent.

If there are any in this area at all...!?

Croatia: Assembly Meets on Needs of Baranja Businessmen

AU1807170996 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 17 Jul 96

[Report by Ljiljana Dajic on the 94th session of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly in Beli Manastir on 17 July]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vaso Zigic chaired the 94th session of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly, which was held today. Our colleague Ljiljana Dajic attended this meeting of members of the Executive Council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly and their guests.

[Dajic] The relations and cooperation with the representatives of the UN transitional administration in Baranja have yielded very good results, to which the high degree of cooperativeness of the Serb side has made a great contribution. This was established by the members of the executive council of the Beli Manastir Municipal Assembly at today's session, following Vaso Zigic's report on the issue. Representatives of Baranja's major companies, members of this body, emphasized that it is for this reason that it is important that UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] show more understanding for the need of the Baranja businessmen to act as independently as possible. This primarily relates to the permit for export of oak logs for the Jelen national park, as a result of planned wood felling, and the permit for [word indistinct] kill of game.

Head of UNTAES civilian affairs for Baranja, (Voycekh Kaluza), and his assistant (Marek Kasparchek), also attended the session. (Kasparchek) heard several suggestions made by the Executive Council members concerning traffic safety, which has been jeopardized considerably by the UNTAES armored vehicles moving fast.

Moreover, the need was emphasized for the acknowledgment of private property, that is, of the right to own hunting weapons, as was the justified possession of weapons for the protection of companies and institutions.

Members of the Executive Council agreed that the UNTAES should promptly inform the public of all its actions. (Marek Kasparchek) reported that a human rights office will soon be opened in Beli Manastir, which, as he said, will improve the resolving of many administrative and legal problems of the local people. [passage omitted]

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Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Want UNTAES Mandate Extended

LD1807195396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1933 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, July 18 (TANJUG)—The assembly of the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem on Thursday called on the U.N. Security Council to extend mandate of the U.N. Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) for another year. UNTAES commenced its one-year mandate on January 15, 1996.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1037 and an agreement reached between Croatian authorities and Serb officials in the region last November entitle the two sides to call for a twelve-month extension of UNTAES mandate.

The Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem borders on Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro). It is predominantly populated by Serbs.

The assembly said it expected the Security Council to persuade Croatia to alter its amnesty law which it said was partial, selective and unobjective. The Security Council described the law in much the same terms in its May 22 session, the assembly said.

The Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem is the only part of the Republic of Serb Krajina that Croatia has not occupied. Zagreb seized most of Serb Krajina in its aggressions on it in May and August 1995.

Serbs in Croatia proclaimed their own state, the Republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched its war of secession from the former Yugoslavia.

The assembly expressed discontent with Croatia's inconsistency in implementing Article 4 of the agreement stipulating that conditions be created for the return of all refugees and displaced persons.

In this connection, the assembly said Croatia had approved 7,000 Serb requests for the return home, but said only 1,500 people had returned up to this point.

Despite the fact that their requests have been approved, male members of families do not dare return home because the amnesty law refers to the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem only, the assembly said.

The assembly also said it must not be forgotten that about 500,000 Serbs had fled Croatia since the outbreak of war.

More than 70,000 Serb refugees from northern Dalmatia, Lika, Banija, Kordun and other parts of Serb Krajina have found shelter in the region.

The assembly called attention to constant violations of Serb human rights in Croatia, and said the latest report by the U.N. Human Rights Commission's special rapporteur Elisabeth Rehn listed a large number of instances of human rights violations, murders, maltreatment of civilians, destruction of private property and preventing Serb refugees from returning home.

About 250,000 Krajina Serbs found shelter in the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following Croatia's aggressions on Serb Krajina in May and August 1995.

Croatia: Mesic Discusses HND-NDZ Rivalry

96BA0355A Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 16 May 96 pp 13-15

[Interview with HND President Stjepan Mesic by Kresimir Meler, place and date not given: "Mesic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Stjepan Mesic was the last president of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. Two years ago, because of his disagreement with the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and the standstill in democratization, Stjepan Mesic left the HDZ with a large group of sympathizers, and founded the Croatian Independent Democrats [HND]. The HDZ recovered more or less easily from that blow.

The HND today is a parliamentary party, and also has deputies in the Zagreb city assembly, which was abolished by a Croatian government decision—because the HDZ did not want to recognize the results of elections in which it was defeated.

[Meler] Mr. Mesic, the Zagreb city assembly was recently disbanded. What sort of consequences does that decision by the state leadership provoke?

[Mesic] The observation by the Association of Seven Opposition Parties that won the local elections, and my own, is that in this case it is illegal. A government commissioner is appointed in order to exercise executive authority, and cannot adopt any acts. He has to prepare elections that are supposed to be held within 60 days from the date when the city assembly was disbanded. Government Commissioner Brolich, however, in practice is substituting for the Assembly. You have seen that he adopted a city budget, which is not done anywhere in the world. There is only the comfortable fact that the budget was adopted with 100 percent of the votes, because he was the only one voting. It would all be a farce

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if it were not a serious drama. I think that now everyone who had illusions that this regime could be improved and democratized has been disillusioned. That rule that despotisms cannot be improved and have to be replaced has once again proven true. I don't know how the situation will develop. Obviously this regime thinks that if it has good relations with the United States it can do whatever it wants. This was the last farewell to any sort of democratic processes. Obviously we in Croatia are heading toward a dictatorship. Probably after the disbanding of the Zagreb assembly it is clear to everyone what refusing to recognize democratic elections means.

[Meler] To the best of our knowledge, that is not the only case of authoritarianism....

[Mesic] Yes, the latest one is the case of Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, a person who is accused of collaboration with UDBA [State Security Administration], back in the days when he was thrown out of all the schools because of one assignment about the homeland. If Rankovic had not fallen, he would not have been able to take a single test and could not have graduated. You also have the latest—not an excess, but a practical attack against Slobodan Budak, a respected lawyer, who was beaten up by Mladen "Tuta" Naletilic. That Naletilic is ruling in Croatia like an occupying power.

[Meler] That case is not quite familiar to the public....

[Mesic] Slobodan Budak, as a result of Tuta Naletilic's attack, had a stroke. Those who rule like that in Croatia think that Croatia is theirs and that they have occupied it. The attack against Budak is a warning that after this he will be shot. The murder of former Tourism Minister Marcelo Popovic also indicates that. It was enough for one person to say that Marcelo Popovic was an enemy of Croatia in order for him to be killed. Admittedly, the one who did it was indicted for an attempt at a fivefold murder. He was released, which shows that the courts are not independent. The only question now is whose turn is next.

[Meler] The evidence against Cicak comes down to the fact that one intelligence officer heard some information from another which that one in turn had read somewhere....

[Mesic] It is disgraceful that VJESNIK, as a serious newspaper and in practice a government newspaper, makes use of insinuations, because what VJESNIK published is not evidence. Possibly something else is involved; possibly the Croatian government trusts the former "Krajina" authorities. In that case, it is regrettable that the Croatian government, on the basis of fraud, is trying to destroy people who indisputably deserve credit for the creation of the Croatian state.

[Meler] To what extent is Croatia a law-governed state today?

[Mesic] Look, if a person who has killed a four-member family is sentenced to 20 years in prison and immediately thereafter released, and once again kills someone, this time a Croatian Army officer, then it is obvious that a law-governed state is not functioning. There is no autonomous judicial system, there is no threefold separation of powers or autonomy for them; nor is the Croatian Assembly independent, nor is the Croatian government, nor is the court. The decisions are made by one man, and the government implements that through the Defense and National Security Council [VONS], which is an advisory body. Everyone has to implement what is decided by VONS, an advisory body for the republic president. That is very far from democracy, and has absolutely nothing to do with democracy, or even with the Croatian constitution.

[Meler] The elections for the city assembly, by law, should be scheduled within 60 days at the latest. Now, however, statements are being heard that they will certainly not be scheduled before the fall.

[Mesic] If we were in a law-governed state, the elections would have to be in 60 days. Now, however, Presidential Palace spokesman Ivic Pasalic has announced that first, several legal documents have to be adopted. Those are the laws on the referendum, on local self-government, on elections, and on the new territorial structure of zupanijas and cities. Consequently, those are so many conditions that they simply cannot be fulfilled in 60 days. That is proof that the elections probably will not take place by the legal deadline. One can rule even without the citizens' will and against their will. How long? Possibly until the fall, possibly until the spring.... I will venture to assert that the elections will take place when a police station is set up in Vukovar and when it is said that the HDZ has accomplished that. That kind of platitude will again be used to deceive the voters, and then the elections will be held. I believe that that is what will happen.

[Meler] And that is all happening in "one of the most democratic countries in the world," as Dr. Tudjman likes to say....

[Mesic] Yes, but our government is the only one claiming that we are one of the most democratic countries in the world. No one else in the world is claiming it. If I heard someone serious in the world say it, then I could accept those claims. If no one else in the world is claiming it, however, then it is a bit pretentious to make claims in that way. There is an interesting thing about these insinuations with the dossiers. They are being done by those people who claim that their own

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dossier has been lost, by those who were able to travel around the world when we did not have a passport, those who returned to the country with those same passports, and those who spent years and years abroad but did not work for single day or hour. The question that arises is what they lived on during all that time. People like that are slandering those who certainly did fight for this Croatia and create this Croatia.

[Meler] You are very critical, but we hear from the HDZ that you will join them again. Is there any truth in that?

[Mesic] Certain speculations have appeared. The only thing that is true is that I met with President Tudjman, as the president of an opposition party. We talked about the Zagreb crisis and about Croatia's current political situation. We talked as partners, not partners in sharing power, but partners at the table. I thought that it would be interpreted that way. A lot of speculative claims appeared, however, about a group of us from the HND would return to the HDZ, or that we were concluding a coalition with the HDZ. None of that is true, however. We are remaining loyal to the Association of Seven Parties.

[Meler] Let us turn to foreign policy. Obviously some people in Croatia still think that they are not ready to accept the Dayton agreement and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina [FBH] in actuality. Croatian Defense Minister Susak stated a few days ago that Croatia would intervene militarily if the rights of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina were threatened in the slightest.

[Mesic] That means two things. The first is that Susak is not a politician, but it also means that Susak is stating someone else's opinion. He does not have an opinion of his own. Accordingly, there is obviously a defect in someone's thinking, because the Croatian people outside Croatia cannot defend itself by having the Croatian Army establish order in a foreign country. That would be called aggression.

[Meler] At the same time, the Bosniak side is being attacked for not complying with the agreement. What do you think about that?

[Mesic] The ones who are persistently accusing the Bosniak side are precisely the ones who have never been even a little critical of the Croatian side. According to them, it turns out that only the Bosniaks are to blame for the Croatian-Bosniak conflict. Those Bosniaks who lost hundreds of thousands of people, who paid the highest price in this war, now have to be the most to blame. In my opinion, there is no logic in that. It seems to me that they are still looking at the option of some sort of possibility of partitioning Bosnia. Those who want to partition Bosnia are probably counting on another conflict between Bosniaks and Croats, and then on the creation of three entities. Then we know what that means, however. The Serbs would merge with Serbia, the Croats with Croatia, and the Bosniaks would be left in a small Islamic state that would be surrounded by enemy states. Neither Europe nor the world can accept all that.

[Meler] But if that happens through some misfortune, that would represent a danger not only to Croatia?

[Mesic] It would be dangerous for both Europe and the world, most of all because it would mean that aggression paid off. All potential future aggressors would draw the conclusion from that that first you have to seize someone else's territory, as Milosevic did, and after that you have to negotiate and be cooperative, and in the end you will keep the area that you seized. That would be extremely dangerous, and I believe that the world has drawn a lesson from this conflict.

[Meler] At the same time, wouldn't that also be an excuse and reason for the strengthening of Islamic extremism?

[Mesic] In order for that "tiny country of Bosnia," as some people in Croatia call it, to hold out, it would have to obtain assistance. Otherwise, surrounded by enemies, it would disappear very quickly. Assistance, naturally, would be provided by the Islamic states, which would have to open up their purses more. In that situation, the Bosniaks, whether they wanted to or not, would have to accept the logic and policy offered by those who provide the assistance. I do not even need to say that various possibilities and various political factions in the Islamic countries lie behind this.

[Meler] Representatives of the opposition parliamentary parties were supposed to go to Bonn at the invitation of Mr. Klaus Kinkel. What happened to keep them from going?

[Mesic] I must say that I was not even invited, and that surprised me, because the Croatian Independent Democrats have four deputies in the Zupanija Chamber, and we also won one seat in the Chamber of Deputies. Admittedly, that deputy left the party, but that does not change anything. One cannot draw a conclusion from that that we are not a parliamentary party. I really don't know why they did not invite us. My colleagues, deputies from other parties, say that they did not want to pour oil on the fire, so that this would not be misused to demonize the opposition once again. I think that that is wrong. We are now living in a European environment, in which just the fact that someone talks to someone does not make him an enemy of his country. On the contrary, it is precisely the opening of communication

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at all levels with the world, i.e., the opposition with the opposition and the authorities with those who are currently in power in other countries, that can only enable the circulation of ideas and the creation of mutual tolerance.

[Meler] It was recently announced that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] had been censured because it did not want to extradite war criminals. People kept quiet, however, about the fact that a similar "slap on the wrist" was also addressed to Croatia. How could that affect Croatia?

[Mesic] It was to be expected that Yugoslavia would not extradite the criminals that easily, because those trials would then reach the leadership in which the plans were created, and from which the commands came. The question is where such accusations will stop—probably the Serbian leadership itself. Consequently, Serbia is not rejecting cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for the sake of those war criminals, but rather for the sake of Milosevic. HINA knows why it is publishing incomplete news. I would rather not go into the individual cases regarding the extradition of war criminals. I think that there would be a general reconciliation if guilt were individualized. Collective guilt will cease, communications will be opened, business will be opened, and in short, greater mutual confidence will be created. That is because now, collectives are accusing each other. If guilt is individualized, the matter is much easier to resolve. Croatia has accepted a law that is binding on it. If Croatia does not fulfill its internationally accepted obligations, it will bear certain repercussions.

[Meler] In his latest appearance, President Tudjman also accused some people in the HDZ leadership of conspiring against the state. Is a purge within the ruling party's leadership also beginning?

[Mesic] In my recent conversation with President Tudjman, I stated my opinion on that topic. The times are past when the repressive apparatus could grow stronger because there was an internal enemy allied with the external enemy. In my opinion that is stupid, and it simply does not exist. Those are will-o'-the-wisps. But an attempt is being made to rule by means of the repressive apparatus precisely on the basis of that danger from enemies. That is the essence.

[Meler] In your opinion, is there wiretapping in Croatia, and can that be a method in the struggle among various factions within the ruling party?

[Mesic] I must admit that I do not know whether they are listening in on me, but I would be extremely surprised if they were not. I do not have any proof that they are, but when I read in the newspaper the text of a conversation between Luka Bebic (head of the National Security Office—author's note) and certain officials in Metkovic, in which a great deal was said at Luka Bebic's expense, I pondered. He intervened and demanded that those who wiretapped him be held criminally responsible. That is proof that wiretapping is going on, but Luka Bebic could confirm who is abusing it. I think that these are all the diseases of all totalitarian regimes. Democracy cannot be stopped by any wiretapping, or any increased repression. Accordingly, anyone who thinks that the processes can be kept under control in that way is wrong. People can be kept under control, but the processes cannot be stopped. There may be certain standstills in the promotion of democratic processes, but they will take place in accordance with their own course and their own logic. We are part of Europe, and the fate of the other countries that emerged from totalitarianism and slowly democratized, some more slowly and some more rapidly, awaits us. We unfortunately have these standstills, but they will disappear.

[Meler] If elections are held in Zagreb, how will the opposition proceed?

[Mesic] There are several alternatives. We may go into the local elections with a single list. That would certainly be a winning combination. Perhaps the system of a joint list could be transferred to the national level, which once again would be a winning combination. There is also a possibility, however, that the parties may be grouped in accordance with their affinities and programs, and then form coalitions after the elections.

[Meler] What if the present situation in which the HDZ does not recognize the results of the elections is repeated?

[Mesic] I think that it is impossible. I do not know of any movement that has been discredited so much in such a short time as the HDZ has experienced.

[Meler] But it obviously does not make an impression on them....

[Mesic] It does not bother them, but it bothers the electorate. They cannot be deceived any longer. That relatively middle stratum that accepted the changes with both hands has now been destroyed. All of the tradesmen who voted, one might say 100 percent, for the HDZ have now cooled off. They have realized that what was promised was not done.

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Croatia: HDZ: Opposition Will Accept 'Unique Proposal'

AU1807165396 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jul 96 p 1

[Article by Nenad Ivankovic: "Zagreb HDZ's Unique Proposal"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On Monday, the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] will disclose its "reviewed" version of the Letter of Intention to the Zagreb opposition coalition. The letter is a detailed and very concrete proposal how to "set up authority" in the Croatian capital. VJESNIK has learned that it is a compromise that should (and must) satisfy all political players. An HDZ official said that this is a "unique proposal," a type of "political novelty."

The Letter of Intention contains a comprehensive view of the political crisis in Zagreb, offers principles according to which the situation could be resolved in a satisfactory manner, and finally proposals for the "division and organization of authority." VJESNIK has learned that the HDZ's proposal is aimed at creating a so-called large coalition, which means that it would include all parties represented in the City Assembly. As far as the "division of posts" is concerned, the HDZ's proposal has taken into account "every party in the coalition, even the Croatian People's Party, which has turned down every compromise, that is, agreement." [passage omitted]

The authors of the Letter of Intention say that "an agreement could be reached in Zagreb" because the HDZ's proposal "is truly a compromise acceptable to all," and also because the current "buildup of tension" and division into "you and us" are no longer productive.

The feeling is that dialogue and a readiness to compromise would benefit the development of democracy and political culture not only in Zagreb but elsewhere as well, and that "last Tuesday's three-hour talks showed that influential people in the opposition's ranks are beginning to realize this."

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FYROM: Ethnic Albanians Rally in Skopje for Second Day

LD1707153596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1435 GMT 17 Jul 96

[By SRNA Skopje correspondent Petar Knezevic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 17 Jul (SRNA)—A rally under the banner "We Demand Protection" was held today in Skopje's main square, Trg Makedonija. It was organized by ethnic Albanian political parties in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The main reason for the rally of about 8,000 Albanians is the prison sentences announced against the initiator of the so-called Tetovo university, Fadilj Sulejmanii, and his colleagues, Miljaim Fejzi, Musli Halili, Nevzad Halimi, and Ardun Rusi. [passage omitted]

At the rally, banners could be seen with the words: "the university will survive," "the university is legitimate," "Albanians—leave the government," and a large number of flags of the Republic of Albania were in evidence. [passage omitted]

FYROM: Poll on Public Trust in Police Published

96BA0265E Skopje VECER in Macedonian 1 Apr 96 p 6

[DATA-PRES article: "Strict Narcissistic Police!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Trust in the police was expressed by 34.17 percent of those polled; 30 percent do not trust it, while 32.67 percent trust it somewhat; 25.67 percent believe that the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is excessively repressive, and 27 percent think that it is preoccupied with its own image and does not carry out its tasks.*

The latest poll conducted by Data-Pres, the Public Opinion Testing Agency, was exclusively for NOVA MAKEDONIJA, on "Crime and the Legal Insecurity of the Citizens," It was based on a random telephone survey of 1,200 subscribers. The survey included two questions that revealed the attitude of the citizens toward the security and public order and peace authorities. The first was, "Do you trust the police," to which 34.17 percent answered in the positive, 30 percent in the negative, 32.67 percent said partially, and 3.17 percent had no opinion. These results indicate that a high percentage of those surveyed answered "partially," which may be interpreted as the fact that almost one third of those polled, although still trusting the police, express some reservation toward them.

The reason for such reservation becomes clear with the next question which offers four choices or views relative to the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] police. The first was that the MVR is "excessively repressive and exceeds its authority," according to 25.67 percent of those polled; the second was that the police are "preoccupied with their own affairs and do not carry out their assignments," according to 27 percent of those polled; the third was that the police "work efficiently in accordance with the law," according to 30.67 of those polled; the fourth, 16.07 percent, "have no idea." These answers lead to the conclusion that only 30 percent of those polled have a positive and affirmative opinion of the police.

Quite interesting indicators are provided by the corresponding answers to the two questions in which the subjects are classified into six parameters (sex, age, education, social status, ethnicity, and domicile). For example, it was expected that women should display greater trust in the police than men. Their answers to the question were 35.63 percent positive, and 25.75 percent negative; 31.66 answered "partially," and 3.75 abstained. Positive answers were given by 32.5 percent of the men: 31.43 percent answered in the negative, 33.57 percent of men's answers were "partially," and 2.5 percent had no opinion. What is noteworthy, however, is that the survey of the youngest category, between the ages of 18 and 29, expressed the greatest lack of trust in the security organs (25 percent answered "yes," 37.85 percent said "no"). Diametrically opposed were the opinions of the oldest group of people aged 50 or older (49.65 percent answered "yes," 26.57 percent gave a negative answer, 20.28 percent answered "partially," and 3.5 had no opinion).

The question of trust in the police was answered in the positive by above all the retired (58.9 percent positive, 13.7 percent negative, 21.92 "partially," and 5.48 had no opinion); their opposite was among the student group (no more than 10.71 percent gave an affirmative answer, 60.71 percent answered in the negative, and 28.57 percent said "partially.") Based on the ethnic criterion, the Gypsies had the most trust in the organs of the ministry of internal affairs (58.82 percent "yes," 23.53 percent "no," and 17.65 "partially"). Views among the Macedonians were divided evenly, consistent with the basic results (35.34 percent "yes," 30.08 percent "no," 32.33 percent "partially," and 2.20 percent had no opinion. The most negative opinion of the police was expressed by the members of the Albanian ethnic group (19.66 percent "yes," 35.9 percent "no," 40.17 percent "partially," and 4.27 percent had no opinion).

The highest percentage sharing the view that the MVR is efficient and observes the laws was that of the individuals 50 and over (39 percent) and the retired (42.47 percent). Based on ethic criteria, the highest positive percentage was among the Turks (53.85 percent) and

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the Gypsies (52.94 percent). According to domicile, the Stip population was first (41.67 percent).

FYROM: Lack of Trust in Judicial System Analyzed

96BA0265A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 13-15 Apr 96 pp 4-5

[Article by Branko Djordjevski: "'Staged Trial' of Judicial Honesty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Judges facing circumstances in which they must prove their innocence;* ital>The clamor of mass judiciary corruption was "backed" by a few symbolic cases; *The general morality and the example set by the state creates a moral, honest, and reputable judiciary.*

The public comments on the work of Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] judges were a slap in the face. Last March's publication of the annual situation concerning respect for human rights by the U.S. Department of State included the worrisome statement that among the citizens "the general belief is that bribery is extant in the courts of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." Recently, this belief was reinforced by the results of surveys that, sublimating the general view, showed that almost 50 percent of those surveyed "did not trust the courts." These are very harsh views, leading to the question of what type of judiciary, and what type of truth is encouraged by the state, which is promoting the organization of an "independent and autonomous judiciary."

A Downpour of Complaints

The citizens' mistrust and the general view that bribery is commonplace can only mean that the public does not consider law and justice to be inviolable features of judicial work. Regardless of the reasons for this view, the judges find themselves in a position to have to prove their "innocence" in the future. The process—which should result in the citizens becoming convinced that this aspect of the overall structuring of a democratic state, based on the law, has been initiated—indicates that the justification of the negative views of the citizens no longer exists. The end of the time of domination of politics over the judiciary, the party-staged trials, sentencing by telephone, buying the truth, prejudice, lack of professionalism, and family ties should support the judiciary with all of their positive attributes [that is, the absence of the foregoing]. The provocation is further countered by the judiciary itself, which is demanding a "trial with proofs." Otherwise, a civil trial would be no different from an accusation of "taking bribes and being mistrusted."

The question of "why are judges mistrusted and are they corrupt," posed without any specific proof being offered, leads to the current view that the judiciary is only a part of the overall atmosphere. This is a transitional model of a society that only yesterday was the slave of party monism and was extremely slow in laying the foundations of democratic pluralism. It is logical for such a society to entertain such thoughts. In an atmosphere in which it is considered "normal" for everything to have its price, starting with most ordinary building permits, jobs, and placing one's child in the desired school, to making business deals, it is clear that in the eyes of the public the judiciary cannot remain "innocent." The established way of functioning of a given society generates a system of "public secrets" relative to the way the desired goal is to be attained and its price. This implies the absence of any legal opposition to such type of social functioning, as a result of which the atmosphere of general degradation becomes integral and subsequently proceeds to function governed by its own rules.

What kind of awakening of the social conscience could there be, judging by the 900 complaints about the work of judges addressed to the Republic Judicial Council over the past 15 months? They deal with omissions and inconsistencies in judicial work. What is symptomatic of this downpouring of complaints is that it happens during the period of the election of judges on all levels. Such complaints may have a specific impact on the elimination of a competitor, particularly when such appeals to the respective authority are classified as a feature of an unstable environment in which the judge works, regardless whether or not the (in)accuracy of such view can be proved. Also contributing to the loss of judicial authority are delays, the personal qualities of the judge and the frequent tendency of the losing party to the dispute to ascribe its loss to judicial bias rather than to the legal impossibility of the case being adjudicated in its favor. This view is reinforced by the "brokering of the matter by a lawyer," who "knows the pay rate of the individual judges."

Guilt Without Proof

The paradox in the case of the thus anathemized Macedonian judiciary is that, meanwhile, few examples can be cited of specific judicial corruption. In the past few years, there have been only two cases of bribery of a judge. The cases still remain undecided, and in no case could they be used as proof of mass bribery. Hence the question of how was such a view of considering judges corrupted developed, when such an opinion does not have any foundations based on criminal acts, leading at worst to a sociological or any other analysis. Only

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two or three in the flood of complaints against judges specifically claim that "such and such a judge accepts bribes." Had there been more cases, the number of complaints would have been greater, for accusations may also be made anonymously.

Be that as it may, a label has been tacked on the Macedonian judges, the removal of which directly depends on the position occupied by the judges in the state and, definitely, on the prevailing climate. Considering that the key legal documents have been adopted, guaranteeing judicial independence and autonomy, that the process of judicial structuring is in its final stage, and that the best judges have been appointed, the removal of the label depends above all on the concern of the judges themselves and the quality of their work. The way things are in our country, the question is whether this could properly guarantee the removal of the labels. The simple reason described in the cases mentioned and the fact that no corruption has been proved do not prevent the opinion the public has of the judges. The problem lies more in the general state of public morality than in the judges. If morality is low, like all citizens, the judges and other important areas of public work cannot expect a better opinion of themselves. In a situation in which the state would like its reputation to be judged by the reputation of the judges, the state should be concerned above all with its own morality and with everything else which would guarantee that no one can be proclaimed guilty without established and proven guilt.

Doubting the Judges, by Vera Terzieva-Trojacanec, member of the Republic Judicial Council

The profession of judge is being hit. Practically all judges are considered "suspicious." However, in dealing with corruption, there are no indications whatsoever that it affects the judges. I believe that the mistrust in judges is due to the fact that they operate with uncoordinated laws, under difficult circumstances which lead to inefficiency ("justice delayed is no justice"), in difficult socioeconomic circumstances, with rivalry in seeking judicial fairness rather than accusing judges of accepting bribes. Actually complaints of this nature have been few. It is not accidental that our questionnaires to be filled in by the judges require the candidates to describe the nature of their property and the way it was acquired.

In receiving complaints, we make great efforts to separate objective from malicious facts, which determines our view of whether a judge enjoys a good reputation in his circles or not.

Corruption Is No Phenomenon

By Dimitrie Dimiskov, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

The dissatisfaction with the judges is also based on dissatisfaction with the society, lack of judicial structure, and slowness. That and the fact that in judicial arguments one of the parties will always remain unsatisfied, believing the reason to be the bias of the judge. Corruption in Macedonian courts in not a phenomenon. We have had no more than a few incidental cases. Personally, I question whether this belief is or is not general.

The Judiciary Is Honest and Responsible

By Slavko Petrov, president of the Bar

The State Department report on the "alleged citizens' belief that the courts are corrupt" is skillfully timed. It does not accuse the courts of corruption but claims that the citizens believe that corruption exists, something which cannot be proved. In my view, this has caused irreparable damage to the dignity of the judges and to the belief in their honesty, impartiality, and competence, which is not good. During my 26 years of practice as a lawyer, I have not encountered cases of dishonesty in judicial practices, motivated by material gain-corruption. I have not encountered proof of the same criterion on the part of my colleagues or parties to a trial. According to my data, there have been only two cases of alleged corruption, still unresolved. This does not give me or anyone else the right to claim that corruption exists. I categorically insist that the Macedonian judiciary is honest and responsible and that exceptions, assuming they exist, do not give the right to subject the judges to anathema.

Heavy Labels

By Bozidar Kocov, chairman of the Judges Association

The administrative committee of the Judges Association strongly rejects the statement that "bribery is usual in the courts," for this charge is not supported by any physical or other proof. We, the judges, find it hard to accept such totally unsubstantiated labels. We categorically assert that there is no corruption. Such severe accusations must be backed by proof. I claim that the tremendous majority of judges do their work honestly and accept no bribes. We cannot tag the entire judiciary with such a label when it is a case of a symbolic number of cases. So far, there have been only two, and the verdict is still not in. The defense against the exposure of judges to corruption should include improving their material security and

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salaries, so that anyone who may be eventually tempted will not yield to the temptation of bribery.

FYROM: Nomination Process for Appellate Court Judges

96BA0265A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 15 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by G. Duvnjak: "Ostensibly About Trusting the Judges"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The issue has been resolved in the case of 69 judges appointed to the three appellate courts in Skopje, Bitola, and Stip. A new opportunity for the judges to fill 19 vacancies*

Apparently, the nomination of appellate court judges for Skopje, Bitola, and Stip has been completed. This marks the end of the unknown future of 69 judges who were nominated to the appellate courts and who will start on 1 June. This offers an opportunity for the judges who will try, yet once again, to have their names entered in the list of the Republic Judicial Council, to fill the remaining 19 vacancies.

For a while at least, tension in judicial and Assembly circles as to whether a real selection took place will abate. By a vote of hands, the representatives gave a lasting mandate to the newly elected judges. This was one of the necessary conditions for the implementation of the new constitutional status of the third power of the state—an independent and autonomous judiciary.

However, what could be heard in the Assembly, during the last parliamentary session was quite expected. Immediately after the publication of the list of names of nominated judges for the three appellate courts, the first to react were precisely the legal circles (especially those of judges and lawyers), who expressed reservations concerning the skill and competence of their colleagues. Dissatisfaction with the suggested list could be sensed in the course of the commissions' debates, where the members of the political parties voiced numerous remarks concerning the choices of the Republic Judicial Council. In the last days, the Albanian representatives stormily reacted to the insufficient representation of Albanian judges, and Article 40, Paragraph 2, pertaining to the requirement of "respective representation of ethnic groups without violating adopted general criteria," was one of the most frequently quoted provisions of the Law on Courts. Also displeased were representatives of townships from which no single candidate was nominated. This was interpreted as a lack of feeling for adequate regional representation or, worse, as favoritism shown to some areas at the expense of other. Remarks were heard about meaningless information on the nominated justices and the lack of proper reasons for the rejected candidates. The fact that something was grating in the tie linking the Republic Judicial Council to the Assembly could be detected also in the fact that while some were complaining about the ignorance of the reporter who was not even present at the commissions' debates, others cited the constitutional provisions on which their status as a qualifies and expert body is based, which was the only thing needed in "gauging" the candidates' competence.

Yesterday's judicial D-Day, which lasted late into the evening, brought about a number of accusations, shows of cruelty, and even personal settling of accounts between representatives and some of the nominated justices. At one point, the impression was that it would be quite easy for the list to be sent back. According to a representative, luckily all ended well after a compromise solution was found. As was to be expected, "the key" was found by the largest group of deputies, which was the determining factor in finding a solution, and which decided to refuse to support the candidates at the sunset of their careers and those as yet to "complete" their training as judges.

What remained unresolved was the question of how was it possible for that same parliamentary body to express its confidence in the "great" seven members of the Republic Judicial Council, and then so fiercely to attack their ability to select the candidates. The expressed rudeness may have been understandable if the expressed lack of confidence was backed by specific indicators (lack of) skill, (in)competence and moral (lack of) qualities of the nominated judges. Unfairly, both qualified and objective judges were calumnied, judges who had repeatedly proved the reputation they enjoy in the eyes of their colleagues and clients, and who were "wholesale" slandered and accused of clumsiness, participation in rigged trials, susceptible to political influences, corruption, etc. Let us admit that this is was the last thing needed by the judiciary that, in the forthcoming period, will have to make an effort to recapture the lost trust.

Perhaps (once and for all) we must frankly determine whether we need an independent and autonomous judiciary or whether it will remain in the embrace of the legislative and executive branches of government.

Elected Appellate Court Judges

Sixty-nine of the 88 nominated judges to the appellate courts of Skopje, Bitola, and Stip were approved by the members of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

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The following justices were approved for the Skopje Appellate Court: Veli Vedat, Stojanka Velkova, Milka Stefkova, Katica Goseva, Mirjana Nemet, Simeon Malinkov, MA, Stefka Risteska, Suretus Bislimovski, Boris Nikolovski, Teofil Tomanovitj, Blaze Trpevski, Simeon Nikodinovski, Slavica Bojadzieva, Kole Mangov, Violeta Muratovska-Nikolovska, Hariklija Martinovska, Milka Ristova, MA, Dane Iliev, Branka Atanasovska, Zorka Barutciska-Bocvarska, Lirije Tjoku, Lence Sofronievska, Nevena Krckovska-Malinkovska, Zdravko Vasilev, Angel Velickovski, Vera Markova, Jorda Veljanovska, Janko Uzunov, Stevan Petancevski, Vera Koco, Jordan Mitrinovski, Filimena Manevska, Rima Andreeva, Safet Aliu, Ismail Limani, Nikola Stojanov, and Zulfitjar Selfulai.

Approved for the Bitola Appellate Court: Sotir Prckovski, Sotir Sekulovski, Bozidar Kocov, MA, Vasko Kuzev, Branko Conkinski, Peco Poposki, Mihajlo Nojkov, Blagoj Stojkovski, Blaze Stojanovski, Kice Juzevski, Vladimir Atanasov, Vasil Nasev, Violeta Dimitrova, Blagoja Donovski, Kosta Spoa, Sonja Spasenovska, Vladimir Radevski, and Vasil Gagacev.

Approved for the Stip Appellate Court: Ljube Nikolov, Makedonka Popkartova, Ruska Paparova, Trajco Puzderliev, Kiro Bojadziski, Dimitar Salev, Kiro Zdravev, Angel Stojanov, Svetolik Nikolov, Pavel Vasilev, and Nadica Dimitrova.

Judges Who Failed To Obtain the Required Majority

Nineteen judges included in the list submitted by the Republic Judicial Council failed to garner the required majority of votes at yesterday's parliamentary session.

The were as follows: Skopje Appellate Court: Ljubinka Boskovska, Mirjana Kareva, Naditsa Kaleska, Slobodan Dzipunov, Vasilka Paskalikeva, Emilija Dimitrova, Nikola Popov, Marija Trajanova, and Jelica Serafimovska. Bitola Appellate Court: Olga Bosevska, Hristina Belevska-Galovska, Simeon Sopov, Simeon Cvetanovski, MA, Boris Cergovski, and Ljuben Nesovski. Stip Appellate Court: Ljuben Velkov, Blagoja Pilatov, Tomo Parcakliev, and Nadica Dimitrova.

FYROM: Identification of New Appellate Court Nominees

96BA0265B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 26 Mar 96 p 10

[Unattributed article: "List of 19 New Judges"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A supplementary list of candidates for judges for the Skopje, Bitola, and Stip Appellate Courts*

Yesterday, the Republic Judicial Council submitted to the chairman of the Assembly of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] a new supplementary list of 19 judges, candidates for judgeships in the Skopje, Bitola, and Stip Appellate Courts.

Taking into consideration the views expressed concerning the expertise and work qualities by the courts, the authorities and the other legal persons by which they are employed, the higher courts, and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Macedonia, on the basis of an objective evaluation of the expertise and the moral qualities of the candidates, the Republic Judicial Council submitted a list of nine new candidates for Skopje Appellate Court justices, six for the Bitola Appellate Court, and four for the Stip Appellate court. The RSS [Republic Judicial Council] stressed in its explanation that in its consideration of the views expressed on the submitted candidates, it took note of the thoughts expressed by Justice Minister Vlado Popovski and Chief Justice Dimitrie Dimisovski.

The RSS submits the following candidates who meet the required expert and work qualities for appellate courts in the Republic: Skopje: Mirjana Dukovska, Skopje Okrug Court justice; Mirjana Andreeva, Skopje Okrug Economic Court justice; Ajet Mehmeti, Tetovo Township Court justice; Ljupco Hadzi Dimov, Skopje Okrug Economic Court justice; Liljana Sazdovska, Skopje Okrug Economic Court justice; Blaguna Koceva, Skopje II Township Court justice; Pavlina Kimova, Skopje I Township Court justice; Jusuf Rustemi, Kumanovo lawyer; and Ljupka Arsenievska, Republic Criminal Court justice.

Bitola Appellate Court: Tome Sardzovski, Bitola Okrug Court justice; Nedzat Ajro, Struga lawyer; Slobodanka Bakovska, Bitola Township Court justice; Ljubomir Bosevski, Bitola Township Court justice; Ljube Nedelkovski, MA, Bitola lawyer; and Danica Risteva, Bitola Township Court justice.

Stip Appellate Court: Dimitar Kovacovski, deputy prosecutor, Stip Okrug Court; Jordan Cvetkov, Jagoda Djurkova, and Kornelija Danceva, Stip Township Court justices.

Tihomir Velkovski, chairman of the RSS, stated that the new list of the candidates will be debated at the Thursday session, at which it is expected that the Parliament will complete the membership of judges appointed to the three appellate courts in the country.

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FYROM: Final List of Appellate Court Judges

96BA0265C Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 3 Apr 96 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Seventeen Judges Appointed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The motion filed by the Republic Judicial Council on filling the 19 vacancies in the Skopje, Bitola, and Stip was voted upon at yesterday's Assembly session. Seventeen in the list were approve by majority vote and two were rejected. The following were appointed to the Skopje Appellate Court: Mirjana Dukovska, Mirjana Andreeva, Ajet Mehmeti, Ljupco Hadzidimiv, Liljana Sazdovska, Blaguna Koceva, Pavlina Kimova, Jusuf Rustemi, and Ljupka Arsenievska; to the Bitola Appellate Court: Tome Sardzovski, Hedzat Ajro, Ljubomir Bosevski, Ljube Nedelkovski, MA, and Danica Risteva; to the Stip Appellate Court: Dimitar Kovacov, Jagoda Djurkova, and Kornelija Davceva. The required majority was not reached for Slobodanka Pakovska, for the Bitola Appellate Court, and Jordan Cvetkov, for the Stip Appellate Court.

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Poland: Grom Exercises With 'Elite' U.S. Commando Units

LD1807164596 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1500 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Commandos from the elite special forces unit of the United States are holding exercises with soldiers from the Grom antiterrorist military unit. Poland is the first country from the former eastern bloc in which American special units receive training. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Poland Nicholas Rey, the exercises prove that the alliance between our country and NATO really does exist and that special units can act as if they were a unified unit. Minister of Interior Affairs Zbigniew Siemiatkowski thinks that the exercises confirm the international recognition and respect for the professionalism of the Grom unit. Siemiatkowski added that as far as the special forces were concerned we were already in NATO.

Poland: Warsaw, U.S. Agreement on Joint Security Program

LD1807141296 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1300 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Leszek Miller, head of the Council of Ministers' Office [URM], has left for the United States, where he is to sign an agreement between the governments of Poland and the United States on a joint security program. This will be the first agreement on such a large scale.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] The program is aimed at combating organized crime and improving citizens' personal security. Funds for the implementation will come from the governments of both countries.

[Miller] The program envisages cooperation between the governments of Poland and the United States in all areas connected with security, starting with cooperation between the police forces through cooperation of treasury and customs teams and of course the law enforcement bodies.

[Correspondent] A good example of cooperation are joint Polish-American exercises of special units.

[Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski] We can now unequivocally say that, when it comes to the integration of special forces, we are very close to integration with the allied forces, with NATO forces. Through the contribution of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] and the MSW units, we provide a contribution to our overall policy of coming closer to the North-Atlantic Treaty.

[Correspondent] According to the Americans, the Polish Grom [antiterrorist unit] is the best unit they have cooperated with recently. [end recording]

Poland: Relations With EU Tense Over State Protectionism

WS1807142396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 18 Jul 96 p 14

[Report by Monika Dzierzynska-Nowak and Malgorzata Alterman in Brussels: "Poland-EU: Why Are They Lashing Out at Us?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Talks between Poland and the EU are becoming increasingly tense. Why?*

On Tuesday [16 July], at the annual session of the EU-Poland Association Council, representatives of the 15 member states accused us of protectionism. They pointed out we were protecting our oil sector, that we have agreed to let Daewoo import unassembled cars duty free, and that our taxes on imports and tariffs on agricultural products are too high.

"The time has come to talk tough. Nobody believed we would be patted on the head forever," said our interlocutors, commenting on the speech delivered in Brussels by Hans van den Broek, the EU commissioner for Central and Eastern Europe.

EU diplomats and representatives of the European Commission and European Parliament unanimously agree Poland has "overdone it" with protectionism recently. "This is not a political, but a strictly economic issue," said a high-ranking official from the European Commission. The French, Italians, and Spanish are particularly disturbed by the special treatment Daewoo receives.

The EU criticized not only the activities of the government, but also the visible growth of the influence of the Polish Peasant Party and other parties demanding that Polish industry be protected.

"Poland is not the only country we are criticizing," soothed one of the EU diplomats. "We fiercely criticized Slovakia for hampering political reforms and Bulgaria for lack of progress in economic reform. Poland has to grow accustomed to the fact that neverending trade disputes are part of EU membership."

"Let us not exaggerate. This criticism will not delay membership negotiations with the EU," says Jerzy Wieczorek of the Polish mission in Brussels. "This was a moment of truth, and instead of taking offense, we should sit down and talk. Besides, the criticism we heard is outlandish. Polish customs on agricultural products were set at the level prescribed by the World Trade

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Organization. Unfortunately, our growing trade deficit in foodstuffs proves that they are no barrier."

"The import tax is lowered each year and has now reached 3 percent. In 1997 it is to be abolished altogether," claims Janusz Rowinski of the Institute of Agricultural Economics. "The EU itself agreed to its gradual decrease."

"In line with association agreements, we are entitled to additionally protect the restructured branches of industry, for example the oil industry," says Rowinski. It is currently protected by high customs and quotas. The latter should be abolished in 1997. Poland is trying to persuade Brussels to prolong the protection period for a further two years (the argument being that in 1997 the gas industry will still be unprepared to compete with companies from the West). The EU is unyielding.

"The charges we have been faced with are minor details that can be negotiated," explains Director Jaroslaw Pietras from the Bureau for European Integration. "Our membership will depend on politics and on when the EU decides to open up to the East. By the end of the week, our answers to the avis [as published] questionnaire on thousands of issues related to the Polish economy should reach Brussels. The European Commission will use those answers to 'grade' us."

Poland: Draft Constitution Judged Unsatisfactory

96EP0083A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 29 Jun 96 No 26, p 16

[Article by Mariusz Janicki: "A Rough Draft of the Constitution: The Referendum To Come Only at the End"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After many months of work the Constitutional Committee transmitted on 19 June 221 articles of the new supreme law of the land to a subcommittee that is to smooth the stylistic rough edges of the draft. There is still no preamble to that constitution draft. Two days after the completed draft of the constitution was presented, the National Assembly met to consider a motion for holding the so-called partial referendum in which the public was to answer several important questions concerning... the future constitution.

The absurdity of this situation was palpable during the deliberations of the National Assembly. It was clearly articulated by a SLD [Polish Peasant Party] deputy who said, "The dough is ready to be baked, but we want to discuss its recipe." The idea of holding the partial referendum (in addition to the legally prescribed acceptance referendum) emerged in September 1995, chiefly on the initiative of the Labor Union Party. The questions to be asked of Poles concerning the constitution were prepared last December, but it did not prove possible to combine the partial referendum with the so-called referendum on property empowerment, which could not be held last winter anyway.

Gradually, almost everyone lost interest in that idea, as was reflected at last Friday's meeting of the National Assembly. Besides, the purport of certain questions that were to be asked in that referendum was such as to provoke criticism. Consider that the popular will was to decide whether we want a unicameral or bicameral parliament, whether the voivodship [province] or the powiat [county] was to have local-government status, how is the president to be elected (by parliament or through direct elections), and whether the state should be impartial or neutral toward the Roman Catholic Church. Better and more precise questions could be readily conceived. It also is difficult to deny that these questions would have sounded much more sensible in 1994, when the work on the constitution had just begun, than they do now, two years later.

The motion to hold the partial referendum lost by a considerable majority of votes (131 yeas, 222 nays). It was fiercely championed only by Labor Union and PSL [Polish Peasant Party] deputies, with the former being particularly concerned about the issue of church-state relations and the latter about the issue—controversial to that party—of establishing the "powiat" as an administrative division.

On that occasion many bitter words were said from the podium about the draft of the new constitution and about the intellectual contributions thereto of particular parties, as well as about those parties themselves. The Freedom Union was told that the failure to consult the public has been in its blood since as long ago as the Balcerowicz era, while the Labor Union was pejoratively called "a fringe party" that wants a "referendum costing half a trillion zlotys" solely in order that the name of God would not be included in the constitution. The SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] was rapped for changing its opinion on the issue of the constitution, too, so often that it could not be relied upon at any moment. President Kwasniewski, too, was not spared; Labor Union leader Ryszard Bugaj accused him of encouraging the Constitutional Committee to engage in backdoor negotiations with the Roman Catholic Episcopate.

Noteworthy also was the deep inconsistency of some comments. The new constitution was termed "fatal," "menacing," "one-party," and "ideologically colorless and lacking feeling," but at the same time the fact of its existence in the form of a completed draft was stressed, and therefore, the argument went, assent to the partial referendum would nullify a great deal of work

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already invested in that unsuccessful—in the opinion of many politicians—matter. There is supposedly no time left to ask related questions of the public, yet stylistic smoothing of the rough edges of the draft is to continue until the late fall, and the referendum of acceptance is scheduled at the earliest for the second quarter of 1997. Thus here the lack of time is a relative concept.

The draft of the new constitution has met with criticism from the opposition. It is, of course, being defended by the SLD. As for the position of the PSL, it is equivocal, for the inclusion of the powiat as a local-government structure in the draft of the constitution makes it very difficult for the PSL to accept that draft. Freedom Union is criticizing the excessively ramified—in its opinion—state-guaranteed social rights included in the draft by the Constitutional Committee. The Labor Union, for its part, believes that these rights are definitely too little. As for Solidarity, it believes that the new constitution is "Red," although it is difficult to find in it any unambiguously communist provision. Then also there are the general accusations that some of the provisions of that draft were adopted by a majority of just one or a few votes by the Constitutional Committee and in the near absence of a quorum, and that games of leaving and returning to the meeting room were being continually played. Another charge is that the completed draft of the constitution is being regarded as cast in stone and absolute, whereas, were their importance measured by the work invested in them, the parliament has already produced several dozen similar documents. And the last "formal" charge is that the Constitutional Committee held an unjustified legislative superiority over the National Assembly, because within that committee decisions were adopted by a simple majority of votes, while the Assembly requires a majority of two-thirds in order to incorporate any amendments in that draft.

The draft of the constitution has no easy life. To the more radical right it is unacceptable in principle, if only because of its nonrightist origin; after all, everybody knows what party holds most seats in the parliament. To a large segment of the SLD left this draft, developed on the principle of more or less forced bowing to the opposition, has in effect become insufficiently leftist. Quasi-leftist motions by the minority have even been made, e.g., regarding a bicameral parliament, while Tadeusz Iwinski and Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz are opposed to that idea.

The president, who has the right to incorporate his own amendments, is deprived in the draft of the new constitution of certain important powers in favor of the parliament and the government. But while the Constitutional Committee was still working on the draft, Aleksander Kwasniewski suggested certain amendments vesting in him greater powers, e.g., concerning national defense. The transmission of the draft to the Presidential Chancellery cannot be merely a formal procedure. There still remains the question of the preamble, which has for the time been deferred owing to the fundamental controversy about the "reference to God," as this matter is put in the Sejm building.

All these problems may implode at the same time during the first reading of the draft on the forum of the National Assembly. It is not unlikely that to the extent that the new constitution has many fathers—and not just those from the governing coalition besides—it will lack supporters. For even now deputies and senators are, naturally, asking on behalf of the public, "Is it our constitution and is it for us?"

[Box, p 16]

Principal Assumptions of the Draft of the Constitution

— A bicameral parliament: the Sejm and the Senate.

— Depriving the president of his current powers as regards appointing the heads of the so-called presidential ministries (National Defense, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs).

— Depriving the president of the power to appoint the chief of the General Staff.

— The president shall not have the right to veto the annual budget.

— 100,000 citizens may present to the Sejm by petition their own drafts of laws.

— The introduction of the so-called universal right to sue for breaches of the constitution.

— The introduction of finality of the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal.

— Relations between the state and the Roman Catholic Church are to be based on "mutual autonomy and independence."

— Administrative division is to be based on "gminas [townships], powiats, and voivodships."

— Article 31 of the draft specifies, "Every person has the right to the protection of his life."

— Article 58 provides, "The rights of parents to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs are guaranteed."

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Poland: PSL Influence Over State Firms Detailed

WS1707132696 Poznan WPROST in Polish 7 Jul 96 pp 24, 26

[Article by Krzysztof Golota and Bartlomiej Lesniewski: "Ministry of Colleagues Cooperation; The PSL Is Building Its Economic Base With the Taxpayers' Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"A break-up of the coalition would cost the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] a hundred top administrative posts," warned Minister Leszek Miller, who is the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM]. The question is about losing posts that secure the Peasants' control over a couple of important sectors of the Polish economy. The PSL politicians have taken seriously the warning of Minister Miller, and that is why transferring of shares from state-dominated partnerships to consortia controlled by businessmen connected with the PSL has been speeded up. "The level of knowledge about economics is low among the Peasant activists but many of them are taking wonderful care of their own interests and the interests of their party," according to a commentary of Professor Waclaw Wilczynski on those activities.*

According to the project of reform of the economic center, on 1 January 1997, ministries dealing with the economy will be erased, including the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Privatization and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation. They will be replaced by the Ministry of the Treasury. Nowadays, the control over companies that are most important for the functioning of the economy is divided among the three ministries and the voivods. After the reform, the companies will be managed either by the voivods or by the minister of the treasury. The Peasants are afraid that a Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] politician will be the minister.

In half a year's time, the PSL will lose overnight all of its assets in the Ministry of Industry and Trade [MPiH] and in the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation [MWGzZ]. Minister Klemens Scierski and Minister Jacek Buchacz seem, therefore, to be doing a lot to limit the ownership area of the future minister, before the Ministry of the Treasury has been created. Jacek Buchacz has concluded that securing for his party a firm base in the companies dealing with foreign trade is more important than preserving the office. The guarantee of the party's influence is to be provided by Piotr Bykowski, a businessman from Poznan whose economic lobby enjoys the enormous trust of the PSL.

"In a sense, Bykowski once 'delegated' Leslaw Podkanski to the post that is currently held by Jacek Buchacz," explains a former employee of Invest Holding, a company controlled by Piotr Bykowski. Before going on to the MWGzZ, Podkanski managed the Family Capital Polish Retirement Fund, controlled by the holding, (where he headed the board of directors). He later worked for another company controlled by the same holding—the Polish Car Association (where he headed the supervisory board). Such "delegates" may be more numerous at different levels, especially in the MWGzZ.

Maybe this is the reason why Jacek Buchacz, who has never before worked for Piort Bykowski, is so eagerly promoting the idea of creating a corporation dealing with credit guarantees for exporters and linked to the interests of the businessman. First experiences with capital consortia for export credits have not been encouraging. The Agency for Economic Development, created for just that purpose, in 1994 lost 2.7 trillion old Polish zlotys as a result of bad stock market investments. Still, Jacek Buchacz has begun forging a new, similar project to "promote exports."

The first project included the creation of a consortium, in accordance with the cooperative law. The decisive voice about the consortium would be given to the minister of foreign economic cooperation, Bank Staropolski (controlled by Bykowski) and the Polisa insurance company. Under the cooperative law it would be possible for Polisa and Bank Staropolski to outvote the minister in the decision-making process, although it was the minister who was to provide nearly all the capital for the cooperative company. The capital was to be provided in the form of shares in the companies controlled by the ministry. Thus, the arrangement would go against the principle of the so-called supervision exercised by the founders. In fact, the supervision would be conducted not by the minister but by Piotr Bykowski and a representative of Polisa.

"The idea was not to invest one's own money but to manage public means and draw profits from that," explains a former employee of Invest Holding. The company resigned from one transaction after another, each of them less profitable than the previous one, and it replaced the staff. Export guarantees were the most important thing.

The solution has been found so effective that the project of the consortium returns over and over in a modified version, although it has already been rejected several times. [sentence as published] Recently, not to be accused of losing control over shares of the top state companies, Buchacz has decided to increase the capital of the private Bank Staropolski, using public money. The bank controlled by Piotr Bykowski has been joined by the MWGzZ into the so-called project of

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supporting foreign economic cooperation, and its share capital has been raised to 35 billion zlotys. Minister Jacek Buchacz has become the head of the new supervisory board. When the new share issue will be registered—with nearly all of the shares taken over by the Polish Guarantee Fund—control over the bank will be executed by the minister of foreign economic cooperation, through institutions dominated by the ministry. At the beginning of May, the Polish Guarantee Fund bought over 121,000 shares of Bank Staropolski from the Export Guarantee Fund-Cooperative Corporation [Fundusz Poreczen Eksportowych-Korporacja Spoldzielcza]. If the MWGzZ is abolished, it will take a long time before the minister of the treasury decides to change things.

The head of MWGzZ has also begun to transform the ownership structure of International Poznan Fairs [MTP]. He has told journalists of a local radio about the details of his project before sharing them with the joint owner of the fairs. Major of Poznan Wojciech Szczesny (the city owns 40 percent of the MPT shares) and Stanislaw Laskowski (the MPT head of the board of directors) learnt from the journalists that the fairs are to be transformed into a joint stock company, and a part of the shares will be offered to strategic investors. Nobody questions the need for financial strengthening of the MPT, but the remaining shareholders should know who is going to be the prospective buyer of the shares worth 100 million zlotys. The State Treasury (the MWGzZ) owns 60 percent of the shares, which does not allow it to introduce changes to the fairs' statute. [as published] According to the regulations, 80 percent of the income is to be written off for investments. If, however, additional shares are distributed among two or three shareholders, who will moreover hold State Treasury shares, they will be able to change any part of the statute.

Are companies controlled by Piotr Bykowski interested in buying shares of the International Poznan Fairs?

Jacek Buchacz is not the only "helpful high-ranking official" known to Piotr Bykowski. Minister of Industry and Trade Klemens Scierski also can be included. He has decided to increase the capital of Powszechny Bank Budowlany Invest Bank—another institution controlled by Piotr Bykowski. The bank is to distribute a new issue of 90,000 shares with a nominal value of Z9 million. The ministry (that is the State Treasury) is not going to pay with its own money for the shares that it will gain. Instead, it will offer a share stake in the form of the property left behind by the state-run company Polmozbyt. This means that Invest Bank will receive the property of Polmozbyt and, in return for that, the ministry will gain a block of shares which, however, will not entitle it to make biding decisions. Also the Agency for Industrial Development [ARP], controlled by Minister Scierski, was interested in taking over the property of the Bydgoszcz Polmozbyt, but it has lost the competition. It is possible that the PSL economic lobby has concluded that its control over the ARP is uncertain, while it could always count on Piotr Bykowski.

The PSL also remains uncertain about the future of its attempt at subduing the petroleum industry. Already last summer, the peasants began activities aimed at joining the Ciech company, which is controlled by them, into the then emerging Polska Nafta [Polish Oil] holding. Still, there is no representative of the Ciech company among the founders of the holding. Ciech would have been a good bridgehead because the company was for a long time controlled by managers friendly with the PSL.

Recently, Ciech has taken on Jan Zagajewski, the trusted man of Chairman Pawlak [former prime minister and now the head of the PSL], known for being involved in the scandal over the computer company InterAms, owned by Pawel Z.

The head of the board of directors, Zdzislaw Matkiewicz, was "appointed" to manage Ciech by Leslaw Podkanski, who held the office of the minister of foreign economic cooperation before Jacek Buchacz.

It seems that Ciech is playing a much more important role in the PSL projects. Preparations for the privatization of the two biggest Polish plants producing soda—Inowroclawskie Zaklady Chemiczne Soda Matwy SA and Janikosody—have been going on for several years. The possibility of buying shares of the two companies, which are planned to be joined into a holding, was what the tycoons of the chemical industry—Akzo, Solvay, and Brunner Mond—were competing for. Finally, the competition has "almost" been won by the Rhone Poulenc holding—"almost," as the privatization process has been joined by Ciech. It is probably the pressure of the PSL deputies that has made the Ministry of Privatization give Ciech the monopoly on negotiations about the privatization process [of the companies], and—finally—Ciech is going to buy both of the companies.

The PSL activists are also involved in the bid over the delivery of airplanes for the Polish army. It is known from informal sources that they opt for the offer presented by McDonnel-Douglas. One should remember that the institutions deciding about the conditions of the bid—the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation, the Committee for Scientific Research and, finally, the Ministry of Defense—remain in the hands of the PSL. With the reform of the state administration center coming up, more

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examples of taking over public property by the PSL management—guided by its care of the state and the taxpayer' interests—are to be expected. Maybe this will be done by other politicians of the party, such as Andrzej Smietanko, the former minister of agriculture, now placed in the Ministry of Privatization, or Marek Sawicki, the new minister of communications.

Poland: UOP Monitoring of Companies, Unions Deemed Legal

WS1807110296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 18 Jul 96 p 3

[Report by "JACH": "Kapkowski Did Not Violate the Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Warsaw Prosecutor's Office has decided that secret orders issued early last April by Andrzej Kapkowski, former chief of the Office of State Protection, which—according to politicians—enabled the monitoring of companies and trade unions, did not violate the law. It refused to institute legal proceedings into the case. We were informed about this yesterday by the Warsaw Prosecutor's Office Spokesman Ryszard Kucinski. The orders were revealed to the press in the beginning of June by Union of Labor Deputy Konrad Napierala. The "Solidarity" National Council filed a complaint against them, claiming they violated the law.

Poland: UOP Section To Combat Drugs, Organized Crime

LD1807161596 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1500 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A new section that will combat organized and economic crime and crime related to drugs trafficking is being set up at the State Protection Office [UOP]. The UOP thinks that Poland is a country through which smuggling routes for all drugs manufactured in the world pass.

[Unidentified Correspondent] The Polish vessel Wladyslaw Lokietek, on which a consignment of 2.5 tonnes of marijuana was found yesterday, had been under earlier observation by the UOP and by foreign secret services cooperating with it. The drugs worth 18 million zloty were hidden in a container holding red pepper. The vessel had come from Lagos in Nigeria. Before docking in Swinoujscie, it had called in at San Pedro in the Ivory Coast and in Germany. So far two people have been arrested and several more are being sought. Those arrested are also suspected of organizing last year failed attempts to smuggle 10 tonnes of hashish, two tonnes of marijuana, and several dozen kilograms of amphetamines and heroin.

Poland: UOP Phone Tapping Subject to Strict 'Procedure'

LD1807185996 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Internal Affairs Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has confirmed that the State Protection Office [UOP] employs post office and telecommunications employees in covert posts. But the minister gave assurances that these people could not eavesdrop on telephone conversations of their own free will.

[Begin Siemiatkowski recording] In Poland, in order to listen in to anyone you have to complete a whole procedure. The internal affairs minister and the prosecutor general are the persons who ultimately issue consents. Before an application reaches the internal affairs minister and then the prosecutor it has to pass through several intermediate levels, where the heads of particular directorates or services evaluate it. They evaluate it very thoroughly, specifying the duration and the effects that the application of this resource could produce for the UOP or the police. So no-one here can do anything arbitrarily. [end recording]

According to Minister Siemiatkowski, only conversations of people suspected of having broken the law are monitored.

During the first six months of this year, the UOP used telephone tapping and mail interception about 500 times. The head of the Internal Affairs Ministry said that was roughly the same as during previous years.

Poland: Controversial Media Developments Reported

96P20460A

[FBIS Report] The Polish media in recent months have reported on a number of controversial political developments regarding the press and public television. One highly publicized event was the sale of the prominent right of center Warsaw daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY to Zbigniew Jakubas, who reportedly has ties to the leftist ruling coalition. The paper is best known for having published, at the time of the November presidential election, allegations that high-level politicians of the present government had engaged in illegal financial dealings. Although Jakubas vowed to keep the paper independent and to double its circulation, 29 journalists at ZYCIE WARSZAWY resigned, telling readers that "the change in the paper's character is part of the general offensive launched against the Polish free media" by "the current ruling coalition," which is composed of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and its junior coalition partner, the

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Polish Peasant Party (PSL). They have "grounds to believe," the journalists charged, that "the new ZYCIE will not tackle topics that might cause problems" for the coalition (RZECZPOSPOLITA, 25-26 May). Responding to assertions from coalition circles that the change in ownership would have no effect on the paper's objectivity, Jerzy Wysocki, ZYCIE'S former acting chief editor, published an article entitled "Restraint on Media Freedom." He defended ZYCIE's past investigative reporting, insisting that the press can only resist political pressure if journalists' views are based on a "system of firmly established values independent of political circumstances and the moods of society" (RZECZPOSPOLITA, 24 May)

According to press reports, significant changes also occurred this past year at another prominent Warsaw daily, RZECZPOSPOLITA. After the death of its French owner, Robert Hersant, and its chief editor, Dariusz Fikus—who had run the paper since 1989 and turned it from the government mouthpiece into an influential paper noted for its objectivity—the paper was sold to the Norwegian company Orkla, which owns a majority stake in Presspublica, the paper's publisher. RZECZPOSPOLITA's new chief editor is Piotr Aleksandrowicz, who was Fikus's deputy from 1989 to 1996. Aleksandrowicz reportedly belongs to President Kwasniewski's circle of friends, leading a commentary in the prominent weekly POLITYKA (25 May) to speculate that the friendship may influence the character of the paper.

Controversy has also surrounded public television since this spring, when PSL member Ryszard Miazek was named its chairman. He and the new directors of the television—Tomasz Siemoniak and Maciej Domanski of the first and second network respectively—have been accused in the press of political manipulation. For example, GAZETA POLSKA (23 May) charged that many programs "fell off" the air when the new leadership, under the pretext that the vacation season calls for lighter material, suspended "the majority of programs presenting a line that opposes the coalition." According to the television leadership's plans, the paper claimed, these programs "will never come back to TV."

Journalists have objected strongly to Miazek's statements on the role of the media, particularly to statements he made in an interview with GAZETA WYBORCZA (16 April). In that interview, Miazek said that journalists "can speak ill" of politicians only if they receive "a government communique on this subject" or a "report" from the government press agency PAP. Although journalists like to call themselves the "fourth estate," they do not embody any authority, Miazek said, adding that, in fact, in a "democratic country the control function of the press is not needed." Asked about corruption and scandals, he answered that "some papers like to expose politicians' weaknesses, but this should not interest public television," whose role is only to inform, amuse and educate. Reacting to Miazek's views in a 24 May RZECZPOSPOLITA article, journalist Jerzy Wysocki declared that Miazek has a specific vision of television in which journalists are not supposed to "to monitor those in power and evaluate their actions" but are supposed to merely report facts to which they are given "access" by governing politicians. In Wysocki's opinion, this "new" model of journalism limits freedom of speech and promotes "neutralization" of public television, thus "allowing the ruling coalition to sleep peacefully." He warned that the media are "under growing political pressure" from a group that has its roots "in times when there was no freedom of speech." This group includes people "who do not understand what the independent media are and what role they play in a democratic system," Wysocki asserted.

A commentary by Krzysztof Burnetko in the independent weekly TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY (12 May) charged that the government parties are conducting a "war on the media" in which the "SLD is determined to seize newspapers and PSL, the TV" in order to silence those opposition politicians and journalists who are "not willing to compromise." Stressing that public television should not become Miazek's "private domain," Burnetko accused him of making arbitrary personnel changes at the TV. He also predicted that the "war" against the printed media would continue because the biggest newspaper distributor RUCH (market value $100-120 million) is awaiting privatization.

On 12 May two other newspapers, TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC and CZAS KRAKOWKSI, expressed concern that once RUCH is in the hands of its new owner, the treatment publications receive will depend on their political orientation. Both papers indicated that among the bidders for RUCH are leading "nomenclatura firms" sympathetic to the leftist government. Included among such firms, CZAS KRAKOWSKI said, are the domestic companies Electrim, Big, and Echo Press, as well as the Polish-French consortium Hachette.

Poland: Meeting Held on Konstantynow Radio Mast Reconstruction

LD1807214996 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The first meeting between representatives of the president, the government, the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council [KRRiTV], Polish Telecommunications and Polish Radio, dedicated to the reconstruction of the radio mast in Konstantynow,

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near Gabin [central Poland], took place in Warsaw today. The decision about resuming the construction will be made in September by the Main Administrative Court [NSA], to which local residents have applied, maintaining that the transmitter will be harmful to their health.

The world's tallest radio mast, which collapsed five years ago, was to be rebuilt on the basis of an act adopted in 1994 by the Sejm. But the Association for Protecting Life near Europe's Tallest Mast complained to the NSA against Plock provincial governor's positive decision in the case. According to the applicants, the more than 100 kW signal radiated by the aerial at the top of the mast harms the health of the adjoining areas' residents. The complaint has meant that, contrary to earlier plans, the reconstruction did not begin last spring.

The only mast with a long-wave transmitter that is operating in Poland, in Raszyn, requires urgent maintenance, reported Deputy Communications Minister Marek Rusin, citing the latest technical tests carried out on the structure, which is nearly 50 years-old. Taking the transmitter out of service would mean that KRRiTV would have to allocate to Polish Radio additional long-wave frequencies. Otherwise, in view of the suspension of the reconstruction of the radio mast in Konstantynow, near Gabin, there could be problems with the transmission of the Polish Radio First Program. Deputy Minister Rusin gave assurances that this would not happen.

[Begin Rusin recording] We will be trying to repair first whatever is essential, reducing the out of service periods to a minimum. We would also like to check out the following notion: Whether for the duration we should not buy another long-wave transmitter and temporarily connect it to a different mast. Perhaps we might consider the situation where some other, West European, station could relay the Polish program, perhaps on a slightly different frequency but also on long-wave. We have also considered these ideas. The point is that the First Program of Polish Radio should not disappear from long-wave. [end recording]

The president's spokesman Antoni Styrczula reported after the meeting that tomorrow he would be leaving for Gabin to hold talks with representatives of the Association for Protecting Life near Europe's Tallest Mast.

[Begin Styrczula recording] The president is interested in Polish Radio fulfilling its tasks. That is why he asked me on his behalf to get involved in the actions that are aimed at restoring the transmission of the Polish Radio First Program from the mast at Gabin. [end recording]

In view of the suspension of the reconstruction of the mast at Gabin, taking out of service the mast at Raszyn could mean problems with the transmission of the First Program on long-wave, said Robert Kwiatkowski from KRRiTV.

[Begin Kwiatkowski recording] But this is a fairly long-term prospect and I think that Polish Telecommunications SA, the Ministry of Communications, the National Council, and Polish Radio will do everything possible to prevent such a prospect, to resolve the problem much earlier. [end recording]

Polish Radio Chairman Krzysztof Michalski believes that the reconstruction of the radio mast in Konstantynow, near Gabin, could begin at the earliest next spring. According to him, provided the NSA rejects the application, work will at the earliest be resumed early next year.

[Begin Michalski recording] The preliminary date that had been assumed, that is August 1997, no longer applies by now, because that would have involved work that should have started last spring, actual work on the facility itself. This work could not begin because the NSA suspended the reconstruction of the mast. [end recording]

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Romania: Ethnic Hungarians Reject Accusations of Ruling Party

LD1807213396 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1900 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] is interfering with the activity of the UDMR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania], this afternoon's UDMR statement says in reaction to yesterday's PDSR statement in which the senior government party accused the UDMR of revisionism and separatism in connection with the adoption of the Budapest declaration.

The UDMR says that it wants to achieve its goals by observing the Romanian laws, state sovereignty, and integrity. It denies that its election campaign is financed by Budapest.

According to the UDMR, yesterday's statement of the PDSR proves again that the Romanian Government lacks good faith when international documents are in question, because the framework agreement on minorities, which was ratified by Romania, too, approves the right of the minorities to keep in touch with fellow-nationals beyond the border.

Finally, the UDMR regards as worrying and unacceptable the fact that the senior government party should dictate its policy and it will not tolerate any intervention from any party in Romania or elsewhere.

Romania: UDMR Reiterates Intent To Observe Country's Laws

AU1807195396 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the statement issued by the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] of 17 July, the Press Bureau of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] has released a statement that emphasizes that the UDMR's program and statute clearly and unequivocally stipulate that the organization wants to achieve its goals, including various forms of autonomy, within the framework of Romania's laws, observing the principle of the country's sovereignty and integrity.

The statement points out that the UDMR has often reiterated its readiness to conduct a constructive dialogue with the responsible political forces in Romania. Moreover, the UDMR has often suggested a partnership cooperation and even alliances to the democratic parties of Romania.

The PDSR, the text of the UDMR statement reads, has launched unsupported accusations about revisionism and secession as well as about the alleged financing of the UDMR's electoral campaign from Budapest, thus trying to discredit the UDMR's electoral effort. The PDSR statement, the UDMR document reads, ignores the fact that Article 10 of the Budapest Declaration makes no reference to financing the UDMR, but rather the Hungarian communities outside Hungary. The moneys mentioned in the Budapest document will go to nonprofit associations and foundations.

In conclusion, the UDMR statement reiterates the intention of this political grouping to continue the dialogue on this subject, which is of national interest, being aware of the fact that the problems of the national minorities in Romania can be solved through cooperation with the democratic forces in the country.

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Federal

FRY: Draft Agreement With IFOR for Use of Air Space

LD1807174196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1728 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 18 (TANJUG)—The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on Thursday drafted an agreement between the FRY and the Implementation Force (IFOR) on the use of the FRY air space for backing the U.N. Transitional Administration (UNTAES) for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem.

The agreement adopted at a session here, presided by Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, regulates technical questions of implementing the general frame peace agreement, the Yugoslav Information Secretariat said.

Provisions of the agreement pertain to the activity of the particular systems of the Yugoslav anti-aircraft defence during the restricted use of the Yugoslav air space by IFOR in case of the need for air support to the UNTAES in the Srem-Baranja region.

Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, the territory between the FRY and Croatia inhabited by a majority Serb population, was placed—pursuant to the November 1995 agreement—under one-year Transitional Administration (UNTAES), with the possibility of extending the mandate for another year.

The Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem is the only part of the Republic of Serb Krajina which had not been occupied in Croatian army's attacks in May and August, 1995, on the Republic of Serb Krajina, the state the Serbs in Croatia set up in their ancestral areas in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia.

FRY: Refugees To Register for Bosnian Elections

LD1807190496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1827 GMT 18 Jul 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 18 (TANJUG)—The registration of refugees who have the right to vote in Bosnia's elections scheduled for September 14 will begin in Yugoslavia on Monday [22 July].

Yugoslavia will open 8,000 registration stations for refugees who want to register to vote, it was stated in Belgrade on Thursday.

Head of the Yugoslav Government Commission for Participation of Refugees in the Elections, Bratislava Morina, said the refugees' massive participation in Bosnia's first democratic elections would make it possible to build a lasting peace there and secure the future for the (Bosnian Serb state) Republika Srpska (R.S.).

All refugees sheltering in Yugoslavia who were registered as Bosnia's citizens in the 1991 census have the right to vote, Vladimir Cucic, the commission's secretary, said.

About 50,000 refugees who have fled the Republic of Serb Krajina can vote in the Republika Srpska, but have to register to vote first and vote personally in a R.S. municipality they choose.

Serbs in Croatia proclaimed their own state, the Republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia.

Cucic said about 150,000 refugees from Bosnia could decide whether they wanted to vote in Yugoslavia or to go to Bosnia and vote there.

The recent registration of refugees has shown that about 200,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serb Krajina with the right to vote have taken shelter in Serbia, and another 15,000 in Montenegro.

Refugees who have fled areas currently under control of the Moslem-Croat Federation and want to vote for Federation candidates can do so in Yugoslavia. If, however, they want to vote for Republika Srpska candidates, they have to vote in a R.S. municipality they choose.

FRY: Assembly Passes Law on Citizenship, Passports

AU1807134196 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jul 96 p 6

[Article by A. Zivotic: "Dual Citizenship Only in Exceptional Circumstances"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The only two legal acts that were passed from the extensive agenda two days ago by both chambers of the FRY Assembly are the Law on Citizenship and the Law on Travel Documents.

According to the new Law on Citizenship, all those who had republic citizenship of either Serbia and Montenegro on 27 April 1992, when the FRY Constitution was adopted, will be considered Yugoslav citizens. The citizens of the other republics of the former SFRY, who until that date were resident in the FRY, can also acquire citizenship provided that they do not have any other citizenship. They will apply to the FRY Interior Ministry.

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As for the refugees, there is a possibility of them acquiring Yugoslav citizenship, and they can apply, provided that they are not citizens of any other country. Whether they will get citizenship depends on the relevant authorities (FRY Interior Ministry), who will decide based on "reasons of justifiability, security, defense, and the international position of the FRY."

Whether these acts will lead to the creation of a large number of stateless people [apatrid], as the opposition parties have complained, will be shown in the application of this law.

Dual citizenship has not been envisaged as an institution. The exception to this are immigrants, our workers abroad, and foreigners "of special value to Yugoslavia." The children of our workers abroad will be able to acquire FRY citizenship if one of the parents is a Yugoslav citizen.

The law also does not envisage the possibility of citizenship revocation. However it is possible to annul the certificate on citizenship if it transpires that it was acquired under false pretenses. The Interior Ministry will decide on this, which is inappropriate, according to lawyers, who believe that this should be under the jurisdiction of the courts.

Both chambers of the FRY Assembly also passed the Law on Travel Documents. What is new is that children's passports and passports for permanent residence abroad have been abolished and passports will be valid for 10 years for people over 27 years of age.

An application for a passport can be made through an authorized person, and the relevant authorities have to respond within 15 days. In urgent cases, there is a possibility of getting a passport within 24 hours. The current passports will be valid for another two years, the deadline for their replacement with new ones. They will be issued at regional police stations and diplomatic-consular offices abroad in accordance with the instructions received from the FRY Interior Ministry.

FRY: Krajina Serb Refugee Official on Citizenship Law

AU1807190896 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jul 96 p 2

[Article by Mirjana Stefanovic: "They Got Citizenship for 1992 Elections, Refugees Today Are Unsuitable Voting Material"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"Krajina Serbs could all vote in the 1992 federal elections, and there was no problem for the FRY authorities then. Confident that this would help them win the elections, the Serbian officials treated them all as FRY citizens and thus gave them the right to vote," Boro Martinovic, secretary of the Association of the Serb Refugees from Croatia in Banja Luka, told DNEVNI TELEGRAF.

"Today, the Serbian authorities are no longer convinced that the Krajina Serbs will vote for them again. They assessed that the Krajina Serbs are no longer useful voting material, and they are proposing a law that would almost completely prevent these people from regulating their status in the FRY," Martinovic concludes.

"The suspicion voiced in one of the issues of DNEVNI TELEGRAF that the Serbian authorities could pressure the refugees in various ways into leaving FRY are already materializing here. Increasingly, more people are arriving in the Serb Republic because they cannot resolve some existential problems such as employment, accommodation, education, and suchlike," Martinovic says.

The law on citizenship proposed by the Yugoslav Government is, according to Martinovic, identical to the Croatian. "All Serbs who fled Croatia and would now like to have the Croatian citizenship must, pursuant to their laws, file an application with their police under the conditions similar to those envisaged by the Yugoslav legislation. The Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs assesses the validity of the applications and can repeal them without an explanation. Examining both laws carefully, the refugees from Croatia can very easily remain without citizenship and the rights that stem from it."

"Furthermore, judging by some Serbian authorities' actions, the refugees from Croatia could now remain without their property. Namely, in order to ascertain with what assets they can embark on the so-called leveling of debts with Croatia, the FRY authorities are registering the assets of the refugees and companies that worked in Croatia. Although property is a private legal category, FRY will represent the refugees in the division of assets. And once the Serbian and the Croatian authorities agree on something, the people will only get whatever will be left over," Martinovic says.

"It is clear from the proposal of the law on Yugoslav citizenship that all those who cleared out of Croatia on time with their coffers stuffed and collecting everything on the way will definitely get citizenship," Martinovic claims.

"Borislav Mikelic, former prime minister of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, fled to Belgrade twice. He is sitting pretty in the office of some sort of a committee of his, and nobody asks him where his 11,000 German marks a month come from or how much his rent is. He

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is well acquainted with this law because he participated in its creation. He knows that he will get citizenship, and he cares about nothing else."

"Most of the 350,000 Krajina refugees (which is the number of those registered before the said federal elections) are currently in the FRY. None of these people know what will become of them because some idiots have decided to fiddle with the law," Martinovic says.

FRY: Bank 'Source' Denies Montenegrin Debt Buy Off

AU1807193996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jul 96 p 11

[Article by T. Jakobi and V. Milovanovic: "No Separate Purchase of Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade—The Montenegrin Government could not purchase a portion of its external debt independently of the FRY, a NASA BORBA source in the Chase Manhattan Bank, which is a member of the London Club, claims in response to the proclamation by Montenegrin Prime Minister Mile Djukanovic that this republic "bought off a third of the total Montenegrin foreign currency debt, namely, 170 million dinars." The same source claims that the purchase of the Montenegrin debt was impossible for at least two reasons. "The Montenegrin Government does not have the money to buy off its debts, and the private investors are most definitely not intersted in such a risky investment," the source in Chase Manhattan explains, adding that the debts of Serbia and Montenegro—that is, the FRY—in comparison with the other former Yugoslav republics have the worst credit rating with the commercial banks.

It was confirmed for NASA BORBA at this bank that the FRY has dropped the lawsuit against the London Club for signing a separate agreement with Slovenia. [passage omitted]

As it is known, only former Yugoslav Governor Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic tried to raise the issue of the purchase of the Yugoslav debt during the time of the sanctions, however, he was quickly replaced and the story remained veiled in mystery. Borka Vucic stated in an interview for NIN that Yugoslavia had purchased debts prior to the introduction of sanctions, however, it is hard to believe that Milo Djukanovic would decide to unveil the purchase of the Montenegrin debt four years later.

"It is quite definite that the FRY dropped the lawsuit against the London Club over the signing of the separate agreement with Slovenia. Your delegation was clearly told that absolutely nothing could be achieved with this lawsuit and also that it contributed to further delays and complications in the establishment of relations between FRY and the London Club." [passage omitted]

This lawsuit not only did not strengthen the FRY's negotiating position but has, according to our source, rather complicated the communication with the consortium of 400 banks. Just like his colleague Andrew Cunningham from Merrill Lynch consultants, the NASA BORBA source also believes that Yugoslavia could have made better use of the first round of the talks with the London Club. "You were on the doorstep of getting a credit rating—true enough, the lowest, but a credit rating nevertheless. Now your debts are considered the investment with the highest level of risk." [passage omitted]

FRY: South Korea Interested in Scientific Cooperation

LD1807185496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1759 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 18 (TANJUG)—Serbian Minister of Science and Technology Dusan Kanazir and South Korea's Ambassador in Belgrade Shin-Woong Park [name and title as received] said Thursday that Yugoslavia and South Korea were interested in setting up scientific and technological cooperation and strengthening overall cooperation.

A government statement issued after the talks quoted Kanazir and Park as saying they were looking forward to the preparation of protocols to this effect.

Park said South Korean businessmen had been impressed by a high level of sciences during their visit to Yugoslavia last year and that they were becoming increasingly interested in cooperation with Yugoslav partners.

Serbia

Serbia: DSS Condemns Milosevic Decision on Ganic Visit

LD1807164096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1509 GMT 18 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 18 Jul (SRNA)—The Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] today strongly condemned the decision of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to invite Ejup Ganic, the vice president of the Croat-Muslim Federation, to visit Belgrade.

"With this move, Milosevic has not only amnestied the man who was responsible for the massacre of recruits of the former Yugoslav People's Army in Dobrovoljacka Ulica in Sarajevo, but has also demonstrated servility

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and complete subordination to the power brokers in the international community," the DSS statement says.

The DSS considers that it is "unacceptable that Belgrade should issue an invitation to a top representative of a regime that still tolerates and even encourages murders, beatings, and murder threats against entire Serb families who have remained in the Croat-Muslim Federation."

"Instead of asking U.S. mediator Richard Holbrooke for protection for the Serbs, Milosevic subserviently accepts his every demand, regardless of how harmful it is for the Serbs in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the reputation of Serbia and the FRY," the statement says.

The DSS believes that such a policy and behavior on the part of Milosevic is bound to meet with condemnation by the broad democratic public in Serbia and Montenegro.

Serbia: Socialist Party Official Marks Anniversary of Party

LD1707221396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2158 GMT 17 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mladenovac, Yugoslavia, July 17 (TANJUG)—The Socialist Party of Serbia is a modern party of leftist orientation, its leader for Belgrade said on Wednesday.

The official of the biggest branch office, Branislav Ivkovic, was speaking in Mladenovac, near Belgrade, at a formal function organised to mark the 6th anniversary of the party, which is the governing party in Serbia and its parent Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Ivkovic said that the party based its programme on experience gleaned by the parties of the Socialist International and on the rich heritage of Serbia's social democracy of the early 20th century.

He said that the Socialist Party of Serbia had assumed responsibility for leading the country at a time when the former federation was broken up through the secession of some of its republics with armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Furthermore, individual factors in the world were trying to make the war spill over into Serbia, he added.

"The Socialist Party of Serbia has had complete understanding for the justifiable struggle for survival of the Serbs in the former Yugoslav republics, although this has put Serbia and Montenegro under fire from the world's greatest powers," Ivkovic said.

He stressed that in conditions when Yugoslavia was being asked to do the impossible, "to forget brothers across the Drina (in Bosnia)," the party's leadership, "led by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, set peace as the greatest national interest."

"Owing mostly to the determined and wise policy of President Milosevic, peace was negotiated at Dayton, Ohio, USA, and the sanctions suspended," Ivkovic said.

Now that the war has been contained and Serbia's independence and dignity preserved, the Socialist Party is doing everything to consolidate peace and make it last, and to give the Serbs what they deserve—equality with other nations, he said.

The world has finally admitted that Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro) are crucial to regional stability, Ivkovic added.

Serbia: Priorities Set on Production, Export Growth

LD1807203496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1959 GMT 18 Jul 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 18 (TANJUG)—A Serbian Chamber of Commerce official said on Thursday that all economic subjects must make the maximum effort to achieve their business targets in order to attain the export target of 1.231 billion dollars by the end of the year.

Chamber of Commerce President Vlajko Stojiljkovic said the chamber supported the Serbian Government's measures and urged strengthening financial discipline and easing the burden of the economy in order to boost production and revive the economy.

Chamber Vice President Momir Pavlicevic said that the most important practical steps for boosting export had been taken when the government struck its barter deal with China for oil and the arrangement to import gas from Russia.

Pavlicevic added that this had also created conditions for the export of Yugoslav goods and solved the problem of financing the preparation of production.

Yugoslavia should meet its export targets under the 200-million-dollar arrangement with Russia by the end of 1996.

Concrete agreements have also been signed for Yugoslav exports to China under the 300-million-dollar oil deal.

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